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1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Objectives 
 
In economic terms ecosystems must be regarded as a special form of capital assets. Like 
reproducible capital assets (roads, buildings, and machinery), ecosystems depreciate if they are 
misused or are overused. But ecosystems differ from reproducible capital assets in several ways. 
Depreciation of natural capital may be irreversible, or the systems take a long time to recover. 
Generally speaking, it isn’t possible to replace a depleted or degraded ecosystem by a new one. 
And ecosystems may collapse abruptly, without much prior warning (Dasgupta, 2008). 
 
Because ecosystems are threatened by human activities, it is important to better consider long-
term ecosystem health and its role in enabling human habitation and economic activity. To help 
inform decision-makers, many ecosystem services are being assigned economic values, often 
based on the cost of replacing such services with anthropogenic alternatives. The on-going 
challenge of prescribing economic value to nature is prompting shifts in how we recognize and 
manage the environment, social responsibility, business opportunities, and humanity’s future. 
 
 
History of the concept of “ecosystem services” 
 
One of the first records of the idea of ecosystem services is from Plato (c. 400 BC) who realised that 
deforestation could lead to soil erosion and the drying up of springs (Daily, 1997).  
 
The modern ideas of ecosystem services probably began with Marsh (1864) suggesting that Earth’s 
natural resources were not unlimited by pointing to changes in soil fertility in the Mediterranean. His 
observations passed largely unnoticed at the time and it was not until the late 1940s that society’s 
attention was again caught by the idea. Several authors promoted the recognition of human dependence 
on the environment in combination with the idea of “natural capital”. 
 
The term “environmental services” was introduced in a report of the Study of Critical Environmental 
Problems in 1970, which listed services including insect pollination, fisheries, climate regulation and flood 
control. In succeeding years, variations of the term were applied but eventually “ecosystem services” 
became the standard in the scientific literature (Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1981).  
 
The review by Vandewalle et al. (2008) of 208 articles that considered the concept of ecosystem services 
provides a good overview of studies from the 1960s and 1970s dealing with the loss of services and its 
consequences, as well as the failure of “human-made” substitutions. 
 
Much of the current understanding of ecosystem services was developed during the 1990s, which saw an 
explosion of books and articles dealing with and expanding the concept. 
 
Source: Huitric, M. et al., 2009. 
 
Some cynics claim that the term ‘ecosystem services’, in addition to the term biodiversity, starts to 
become another environmental buzzword (Brown et al., 2007) or complexity blinder (Norgaard, 
2010). Nevertheless, during the last years, a considerable intellectual development in the 
understanding of ecosystem goods and services has taken place and interest has grown in refining 
the analysis and evaluation at various scales (for example, TEEB, 2009; 2010a; 2010b). Moreover, 
ecosystem services emerge in many national initiatives, such as the UK National Ecosystem 
Assessment – an advanced interdisciplinary assessment of ecosystems and their services (Watson 
and Albon, 2010; Bateman et al., 2011). 
 
This report aims at researchers and policy analysts who can benefit from a clear understanding of 
how ecosystem services relate to economics and policy. It focuses on the economic foundations of 
the analysis and evaluation of ecosystem services. What do we know from the literature? How can 
we apply the results in policy oriented studies for government, business and civil society? How to 
contribute to the policy debate on the provision of ecosystem services? In order to answer these 
questions, we will borrow heavily from and duly refer to the existing literature on (economic 
aspects) of ecosystem services.  
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There is a fast growing number of papers dealing with those services. Although the modern 
concept of ecosystem services was pioneered several decades ago – it was used in the late 1970s 
to explain societal dependence on nature – it has received significant attention since the 
appearance of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment in 2005 (see also Chapter 2). For example, 
scientific journals, such as Ecological Economics (2007), PNAS (2008), Frontiers in Ecology and the 
Environment (2009), and Biodiversity and Conservation (2010) dedicated special issues and special 
sections to the topic. In July 2012, a new academic journal dedicated to ecosystem services was 
launched by Elsevier (Braat, 2012). Also entire volumes have been written on ecosystem services 
(Naeem et al., 2009; ten Brink, 2011).  
 
 
 
1.2 Context 
 
Ecosystem services are dynamic. It is useful to consider them in terms of the drivers and pressures 
for change and how these result in policy responses. Bringing ecosystem services into the policy 
sphere requires an integrated approach. It also requires recognizing the nature of the evidence and 
the various stages shown in Figure 1.1.  
The conceptual framework summarises the cycle that links human societies and their well-being 
with the environment, building on the framework used by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
(MEA). The framework emphasises the role of ecosystems in providing services that benefit people. 
Ecosystem services are the outputs of ecosystems from which people derive benefits including 
goods and services (e.g. food and water purification, which can be valued economically) and other 
values (e.g. spiritual experiences, which have a non-economic value). The combination of these 
goods, services and values provide our overall human well-being (expressed in society as health, 
wealth and happiness). The values that people receive from ecosystems may alter the way that 
they choose to use and manage the environment. This in turn leads to further changes in the 
environment.  
Valuing ecosystem services typically requires two sources of knowledge: (i) on the ecological 
processes, components, and functions that generate these services; and (ii) on the way in which 
these services translate into specific benefits (Barbier, 2007). In this report, we particularly focus 
on the second sources of knowledge, which is mainly economic in nature by dealing with issues of 
scarcity, supply and demand, ownership, and preferences. Moreover, the specific design of the 
valuation exercise for ecosystem services should depend on its purpose or the role that it will play 
in the policy process. In the words of Slootweg and Van Beukering (2008, p. 18) “there are four 
reasons to value ecosystem services:  
• Advocacy: economic valuation is often used to advocate the economic importance of the 
ecosystem services, with the ultimate purpose of encouraging sustainable development. 
(…) 
• Decision making: valuation can assist in the government to allocate scarce resources to 
achieve economic, environmental and social goals. (…) Economic valuation studies are 
critical to assist decision makers in making fair and transparent decisions. 
• Damage assessment: valuation is increasingly used as a means of assessing damage 
inflicted on an ecosystem. (…) 
• Sustainable financing: valuation of ecosystem services can be used to set taxes or charges 
for the use of those goods and services. (…) valuation results can be used to set taxes or 
charges at the most desirable level.” 
 
Although the economic foundations of the analysis and valuation of ecosystem services are 
important for each of the four reasons, we focus in this report especially on the goal of decision 
making. As a concept for better management and provision of ecosystems, ecosystem services rely 
on the concept being incorporated into wider processes in order to have real-world effects. 
Evidence is required at a variety of a points (shown in bold in the diagram below) in order to take 
account of the value of the ecosystem services in the policy / decision making process (DEFRA, 
2010). 
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Figure 1.1 Ecosystem services in the policy sphere. Source: DEFRA, 2010 
 
This means that knowledge gathering and sharing between different disciplines and/or different 
evidence themes is beneficial. Knowledge sharing also needs to occur across the variety of scales 
at which ecosystem services are provided and managed (e.g., between national and sub-national 
levels). Knowledge refers here to data and methods involved in providing evidence in the six 
themes. Knowledge sharing will increase the value of the evidence within the following themes 
(DEFRA, 2010).  
• Understanding the value of ecosystems and the goods and services they provide  
• Resources to enable others to embed an ecosystems approach in policy and decision making  
• Public engagement and behaviour change to positively impact ecosystem services 
• Better understanding the science regarding impacts on ecosystems, their resilience and 
sensitivity  
• Management of ecosystems and the practice services they provide  
• Examining the linkages/interactions between ecosystems and the services they provide.  
 
Evidence is a prerequisite for effecting change in ecosystem services through policies and projects. 
This analysis of the evidence requirements and how to achieve them shows how, in practice, 
ecosystem services is a concept which embodies interdisciplinary working.  
In dealing with the economics of the ecosystem services, this report focuses both on the economic 
valuation, as well as on the resources for policy. 
 
1.3 Structure of this report 
 
The concept of ecosystem services covers a wide variety of costs and benefits of ecosystems. The 
next chapter describes the modern classification of these services. This is followed by chapters on 
the history of economic thought. Chapter 3 is about general economics and chapter 4 about the 
subdisciplines of environmental and ecological economics. Chapter 5 discusses the valuation of 
ecosystems and their services and chapter 6 the analysis of trade-offs (chapter 6).  
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2.  Classification of ecosystem services  
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Humans benefit from a multitude of resources and processes that are supplied by natural 
ecosystems. Collectively these benefits are known as ecosystem services. While scientists and 
environmentalists have discussed ecosystem services for decades, these services were popularized 
and their definitions formalized by the United Nations 2004 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
(MEA, 2005). This assessment focused on the contributions of ecosystems to human well-being (an 
anthropocentric point of view, thus), while at the same time recognizing the potential for non-
anthropocentric sources of value.  
 
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) was called for by the United Nations Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan in 2000 in his report to the UN General Assembly, We the Peoples: The Role of the United 
Nations in the 21st Century. The MEA was carried out between 2001 and 2005 to assess the 
consequence of ecosystem change for human well-being, by attempting to bring the best available 
information and knowledge on ecosystem services to bear on policy and management decisions. The MEA 
established the scientific basis for action needed to enhance the conservation and sustainable use of 
ecosystems and their contribution to human well-being. The MEA was in part a global assessment, but to 
facilitate better decision making at all scales, 34 regional, national and local scale assessments (or sub-
global assessments) were included as core project components. Since the release of the MEA, further 
subglobal assessments have started. 
 
The MEA categorises ecosystem services into four different classes. These are:  
• Provisioning Services which are the products obtained from ecosystems, including food, fibre, 
fuel, genetic resources, ornamental resources, freshwater, biochemical, natural medicines and 
pharmaceuticals. 
• Regulating Services which are the benefits obtained from the regulation of ecosystem 
processes including air quality regulation, climate regulation, water regulation, erosion 
regulation, water purification and waste treatment, disease regulation, pest regulation, 
pollination and natural hazard regulation. 
• Cultural Services which are the non-material benefits people obtain from ecosystems through 
spiritual enrichment, cognitive development, reflection, recreation, and aesthetic experiences, 
including cultural diversity, spiritual and religious values, knowledge systems, educational 
values, inspiration, aesthetic values, social relations, sense of place, cultural heritage values, 
recreation and ecotourism. 
• Supporting Services which are necessary for the production of all other ecosystem services. 
They differ from provisioning, regulating, and cultural services in that their impacts on people 
are often indirect or occur over a very long time, whereas changes in the other categories have 
relatively direct and short-term impacts on people. Some services, like erosion regulation, can 
be categorised as both a supporting and a regulating service, depending on the time scale and 
immediacy of their impact on people. These services include soil formation, photosynthesis, 
primary production, and nutrient and water cycling. 
 
The publication of the MEA has stimulated widespread, international debate about the importance 
of the links between ecosystems and human well-being. The MEA found that at global scales, 60% 
of the ecosystem services on which people depend were being damaged through human action or 
mismanagement. As a result there is now considerable interest in assessing ecosystem services at 
regional and national scales. The MEA was unable however to provide adequate scientific 
information to answer a number of important policy questions related to ecosystem services and 
human well-being. In some cases, the scientific information may well exist already but the process 
used and time frame available prevented either access to the needed information or its 
assessment. In many cases it is clear that either the data needed to answer the questions were 
unavailable or the knowledge of the ecological or social system was inadequate (VandeWalle et al., 
2008). 
 
 
2.2 Typology of ecosystem services 
 
There are various definitions of ecosystems services in the literature. The most recent revision by 
TEEB to synthesize work in this field and prevent double counting in ecosystem services audits, has 
revised the MEA definition to replace "Supporting Services" with "Habitat Services" (TEEB, 2010).  
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Table 2.1 Typology of ecosystem services in TEEB 
Category Main service types 
PROVISONING SERVICES 1 Food (e.g. fish, game, fruit) 
2 Water (e.g. for drinking, irrigation, cooling) 
3 Raw Materials (e.g. fiber, timber, fuel wood, fodder, 
fertilizer) 
4 Genetic resources (e.g. for crop-improvement and medicinal 
purposes) 
5 Medicinal resources (e.g. biochemical products, models & 
test-organisms) 
6 Ornamental resources (e.g. artisan work, décorative plants, 
pet animals, fashion) 
REGULATING SERVICES 7 Air quality regulation (e.g. capturing (fine)dust, chemicals, 
etc) 
8 Climate regulation (incl. C-sequestration, influence of 
vegetation on rainfall, etc.) 
9 Moderation of extreme events (eg. storm protection and 
flood prevention) 
10 Regulation of water flows (e.g. natural drainage, irrigation 
and drought prevention) 
11 Waste treatment (especially water purification) 
12 Erosion prevention 
13 Maintenance of soil fertility (incl. soil formation) 
14 Pollination 
15 Biological control (e.g. seed dispersal, pest and disease 
control) 
HABITAT SERVICES 16 Maintenance of life cycles of migratory species (incl. 
nursery service) 
17 Maintenance of genetic diversity (especially in gene pool 
protection) 
CULTURAL & AMENITY 
SERVICES 
18 Aesthetic information 
19 Opportunities for recreation & tourism 
20 Inspiration for culture, art and design 
21 Spiritual experience 
22 Information for cognitive development 
Source: TEEB, 2010.  
 
Stocks and flows 
 
It is important to distinguish clearly between an ecological stock or an ecosystem service flow (Ash, 
N. et al., 2010). In general, stocks are expressed in units of quantity (e.g., metric tons, m2, or 
ha), while flows are expressed as quantities per unit time (e.g., kg/year or m3/second). Usually, 
ecosystem services are flows, both on the supply side and the demand side. Stocks and flows need 
to balance: if the consumption exceeds the production over a given period, the stock will be 
depleted by an equivalent amount. It is usually necessary to express ecosystem services in both 
flow and underlying stock terms. The significance of a particular flow is hard to judge unless the 
size of the stock is known (and for renewable resources, the maximum flow that could be extracted 
from it without depleting the stock). Similarly, a stock by itself seldom says anything useful about 
the ecosystem service flows that are actually, or potentially could be, derived from it. 
 
“Ecosystem services” are not restricted to living or renewable resources. Nonrenewable natural 
resources, such as ore bodies, fossil aquifers, and deposits of coal, oil, or gas, can also be regarded 
as natural capital stocks delivering a flow of services that end up supporting human well-being.  
 
Not all ecosystem services are “consumed” when they are used. For instance, admiring a cultural 
landscape or a biodiversity icon does not necessarily make it unavailable to be admired by 
someone else. Even water is not destroyed when it is used: it is typically converted to another form 
(e.g., somewhat polluted) that may be unsuitable for immediate reuse for the same purpose but 
may be useful for another purpose.  
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The flows of provisioning services can often be directly measured, as a harvest yield over a period 
of time. Alternatively, they can sometimes be measured as a change in the stock over a given 
period. For instance, ecosystems may provide a climate regulating service by sequestering carbon 
from the atmosphere. It is possible to measure this flux of carbon dioxide (CO2) from the 
atmosphere into the ecosystem directly, but the equipment needed is expensive and difficult to 
use. Over time, the net flux will show up as a change in the stock of carbon in the biomass, soil, 
sediment, or water body, and this is easier to measure. 
 
 
2.3 Ecosystem services and ecosystem dis-services 
 
Ecosystems are a two-edged sword; there exist ecosystem services and dis-services. An example is 
given by wetlands. The service value of wetlands has long been established, as they provide a suit 
of benefits from bird habitat to water purification. However, in many parts of the world they are 
also a source of disease; for example, malaria can easily be classed as a very serious ecosystem 
dis-service. As dis-services for agriculture Zhang (2007) distinguishes between i) Pest damage, ii) 
Competition for water from other ecosystems and iii) Competition for pollination services. 
 
Other examples include those set out by Lyytimaki (2008) regarding ecosystem dis-services in 
urban areas. Bats, rats and foxes in urban parks can cause fear or anxiety. People can also feel 
unsafe in poorly managed urban green space, especially at night. Disservices can be seemingly 
inconsequential such as fallen leaves causing increased breaking distances and traffic accidents. 
Foliage along roadsides can decrease visibility (at corners for example), also leading to increased 
traffic accidents.  
 
The examples here show that ecosystem disservices can occur in a wide range of contexts (from 
rural to urban) and affect a wide range of ecosystem services (from provisional to cultural). While 
much of this report will focus on services, any policy or project analysis must be aware of potential 
dis-services. Many of the points that will be made regarding services are equally applicable to dis-
services.  
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3. From pre-classical economics to modern economics 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews the historic development of the conceptualization of nature and examines 
critical landmarks in economic theory and practice. A distinction is made between four phases: the 
pre-classical economics, the classical economics, the neo-classical economics and finally the 
modern economics.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Landmarks in the evolving conception of nature by economics 
  
Source: Gómez-Baggethun, E., et al., 2009. 
 
 
In the pre-classical economics the exploitation of land (nature) was conceived as the main source 
of wealth. In the classical economics land was surpassed by labour as the main source of wealth, 
although the combination was still seen as crucial. In the neo-classical economics the source of 
wealth was conceptually decoupled from the physical world (Gómez-Baggethun, E., et al., 2009). 
In modern economics the environment would come back as an issue of crucial importance for 
human well-being. 
 
 
3.2 Pre-classical economics 
 
From the 16th to the 18th century, economic philosophy and practice were led by mercantilism, the 
counterpart of political absolutism. It promoted governmental regulation of a nation’s economy for 
the purpose of augmenting state power at the expense of rival national powers. According to 
Mercantilism, wealth was mainly based on a large population that provided a large labor supply and 
on the extraction of precious metals, such as gold and silver. If a nation did not possess mines or 
have access to them, precious metals were obtained by trade. Land was an important source of 
wealth, as it allowed feeding a growing population and served as a source of precious materials. In 
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addition, it functioned as the pivotal element in the feudal order, being the stable basis of the 
military, judicial, administrative, and political systems (Hubacek and Van den Berg, 2006).  
 
In the 1750s there developed in France a school of economic thought which had as its first principle 
that natural resources, and fertile agricultural land in particular, were the source of material 
wealth. Physiocracy, meaning literally ‘rule of nature,’ is generally acknowledged as the first 
organized scientific school of economic thought. The Physiocrats maintained that the economic 
process could be understood by focusing on a single physical factor: the productivity of agriculture. 
The movement was particularly dominated by François Quesnay (1694–1774) and Anne-Robert-
Jacques Turgot (1727–1781).  
 
The most significant contribution of the Physiocrats was their emphasis on productive work as the 
source of national wealth. This is in contrast to mercantilism, which focused on the ruler's wealth, 
accumulation of gold, or the balance of trade. Physiocrats viewed the production of goods and 
services as consumption of the agricultural surplus, since the main source of power was from 
human or animal muscle and all energy was derived from the surplus from agricultural production. 
  
The perceptiveness of the Physiocrats' recognition of the key significance of land was reinforced in 
the following half-century, when fossil fuels had been harnessed through the use of steam power. 
Productivity increased manyfold. Railways, and steam-powered water supply and sanitation 
systems, made possible cities of several millions, with land values many times greater than 
agricultural land.  
 
According to the Physiocrats, agriculture was the supreme occupation because it alone yielded a 
disposable surplus over cost.  The agricultural laborers formed the ‘productive’ class, whereas the 
artisans and merchants were labelled the ‘sterile’ class.  Juxtaposed between the two was the 
‘proprietary’ class consisting of the landowners, the king, and the clergy who received in the form 
of rent, taxes, and thithes the dollar value of the net product produced by agriculture.  
 
Kenneth E. Boulding has explained this view on the special role of land as a ‘food chain theory’ 
(Hubacek and Van den Bergh, 2006): “The farmer produces . . . more corn than the farmer and his 
family alone can eat. This results in a surplus. If this is fed to cattle it produces meat and milk, 
which improve human nutrition and perhaps enable the farmer to produce more food. . . . Food 
and leather ‘fed’ to miners produce iron ore. Food and iron ore ‘fed’ to a smelter produce iron. Food 
and iron ‘fed’ to a blacksmith produce tools or, ‘fed’ to a machinist, machines. The tools and 
machines ‘fed’ back to the farmer produce more food.” 
 
In the physiocratic model, economic rent was derived from unrecompensed work done by Nature 
since in setting food prices, cultivators take in account their labor and expenses as well as the 
surplus value contributed by the fertility of the soil. Quesnay measured and traced the value of the 
flow of net product between the three classes in his Tableau Economique, a model which 
represented for the first time, albeit in crude from, economic concepts such as general equilibrium 
and the Leontief input-output system, both of which became widely used economic models. 
 
Influential for both the Physiocrats and later the Classical Economists was Cantillon’s Equation de la 
Terre & du Travail. Cantillon regarded land as the only truly original or primary input. The intrinsic 
values of commodities were reducible to the quantity of land directly and indirectly required for 
their production (Hubacek and Van den Bergh, 2006).  
 
The influence of the Physiocratic School peaked in the 1760s and declined rapidly thereafter. For 
most economists, the Physiocrats represent a historical curiosity and a few of their biophysical 
principles are evident in neoclassical or Marxist theory. However, their steadfast belief that Nature 
was the source of wealth became a recurring theme throughout biophysical economics. 
 
 
3.3 Classical economics 
 
Classical economics started at the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution. This was the time of the 
rise of the industrialist class, and the decline of the importance of landlords. The main research 
agenda of classical economists was to derive the factors for the wealth of nations and the 
distribution of income amongst the factors of production: land, labor, and capital. The importance 
of technological progress and capital for productivity and thus economic growth was recognized, 
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but many classical authors retained from the Physiocrats their special treatment of land (Hubacek 
and Van den Bergh, 2006). 
 
In contrast to the Physiocrat belief that land was the primary source of value, Classical economists 
began to emphasize labour as the major force backing the production of wealth. Many of the 
fundamental concepts and principles of classical economics were set forth in Smith’s An Inquiry 
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776). When Adam Smith wrote his treatise, 
only a small number of water-driven industrial establishments existed and the Industrial Revolution 
had barely started. This helps to explain his conviction that agriculture, and not manufacturing was 
the principal source of wealth. Smith considered the produce of the land as the principal source of 
the revenue and wealth of every country. For Smith agriculture was more productive than 
manufacturing because it has two powers concurring in its production, land and labor, whereas 
manufacturing has only one (labor). Division of labor was the main element of productivity increase 
(Hubacek and Van den Bergh, 2006).  
 
In Adam Smith’s theory of value, under competition, a costless item can never have a price. The 
services of land are costless in comparison to the capital invested in the land. The price paid for the 
use of land is, according to Smith, a monopoly rent. Smith’s theory of rent anticipated later 
approaches to rent, which varied with different levels of fertility, its location, and the transport 
system. 
 
Classical economists found natural resources worthy of distinct analytical treatment because the 
services they offer are free. Besides labor (and later also capital), land remained as a separate 
factor in the production function. Its consideration as a nonsubstitutable production input explains 
to a degree the emphasis of some Classical economists on physical constraints to growth. This is 
reflected for instance in (Gómez-Baggethun, E., et al., 2009): 
 
• Ricardo's law on diminishing returns on land;  
 
The law of diminishing marginal returns, propounded by David Ricardo, expresses a relationship 
between input and output, stating that adding units of any one input (labor, capital, etc.) to fixed 
amounts of the others will yield successively smaller increments of output ("Diminishing Returns"). 
  
• Malthus' concerns on population growth;  
 
Robert Malthus believed that natural rates of human reproduction, when unchecked, would lead to 
geometric increases in population: population would grow in a ratio of 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64 and so 
on. However, he believed that food production increased only in arithmetic progression: 2, 4, 6, 8, 
10. It seemed obvious to him that something had to keep the population in check to prevent 
wholesale starvation. He said that there were two general kinds of checks that limited population 
growth: preventative checks and positive checks. Preventative checks reduced the birth rate; 
positive checks increased the death rate. 
 
Natural capital, in the form of land, which according to Malthus included “the soil, mines, and 
fisheries of the habitable globe”, thus maintained a core position in Classical economic analysis.  
 
Whereas Malthus, Ricardo and others focused on different qualities of land, Johann Heinrich von 
Thuenen used distance as the central concept. Spatial economics and geography claim von 
Thuenen as one of their fathers of their discipline. His concept of diminishing returns is also 
perceived as a precursor to the marginalist approach of neoclassical economics (Hubacek and van 
den Bergh, 2006). Von Thuenen was interested in the pattern of agricultural production around the 
central town in an isolated state, in a homogenous featureless plain of equal fertility. He sought the 
principles that would determine the prices that farmers receive for their products, the rents that 
are earned and the patterns of land use that accompany such prices and rent. He developed a 
system of concentric circles, in which bulky or perishable goods are produced closer to the city and 
valuable or durable goods are imported from further distance. In this central town the price of a 
product like grain is determined by the production and transportation costs from the most distant 
farms whose produce is required to satisfy the town’s demand. Since grain must sell at the same 
price irrespective of its location of production, ground rent is highest in the first concentric ring and 
decreases with distance. Von Thuenen arrived at similar conclusions as Ricardo in observing that 
differences in the quality of soil will determine the ground rent in the same manner as its proximity 
to the central town. 
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In the 19th century, driving forces such as industrial growth, unprecedented technological 
development and the acceleration of capital accumulation triggered a series of changes in Classical 
economic thinking in a direction that progressively led nature to lose the distinct analytical 
treatment it had previously received. Three critical changes can be highlighted (Gómez-Baggethun, 
E., et al., 2009): a slow move of the primary focus on land and labor towards the factors labor and 
capital; a move from physical to monetary analysis; and, a move in the focus from use values to 
exchange values.  
 
 
3.4 Neo-classical economics 
 
The unifying approach of classical economists was their analysis of values (land, labor and capital) 
embodied in the product to determine its price. Even though utility was seen as a precondition for 
goods to have value, classical economists were led by their orientation towards the long-run, where 
relative prices were only determined by costs of production. Hence their search for a labor or land 
content establishing values and prices. A very different orientation was adopted by the new 
neoclassical school, triggered by Jevons, Marshall, Menger, and Walras, in their search for 
interdependencies between utilities in consumption and costs in production.  
 
The marginalist revolution, started in the 1870s would have deep effects in the subsequent 
economic analysis of nature. The distinguishing characteristics of neoclassical economics were 
probably shaped by the longevity of the industrial revolution, the pace of technological 
developments, shifts from food and fiber- based economies to mineral and fuel-based economies, 
and economies in the industrialized world that seemed to be almost independent of extractive 
industries (Hubacek and Van den Bergh, 2006). 
 
By the fall of the Classical economics period some authors kept paying substantial attention to natural 
resources in physical terms. For instance, in his 1865 book The coal question, Stanley Jevons raised 
concerns about the depletion of coal stocks. The so-called Jevons paradox (recently “rediscovered” as 
rebound effect) stated that gains in energy efficiency per unit of production could augment total energy 
consumption.  
 
Since the accomplishment of the marginalist revolution, Neoclassical economics gradually restricted 
its analysis to the sphere of exchange values. Quite explicitly in this respect, Pigou (cited by 
Gomez, ....) wrote: “The one obvious instrument of measurement available in social life is money. 
Hence, the range of our inquiry becomes restricted to that part of social welfare that can be put 
directly or indirectly into relation with the measuring rod of money”.  
 
Neoclassical economic theory started to elaborate on how technological innovation would allow for 
increased substitutability between production inputs such as land and capital, eventually consigning 
concerns on physical scarcity to oblivion (Georgescu-Roegen, 1975). Substitution was elevated to 
the central principle on the basis of which both the price system and the production system are 
explained. The neoclassical approach ignores the essential complementarity between different 
factors of production or different types of activities. 
 
As such, Neo-classical economists consider that different forms of capital (be they natural, man-
made, social or financial) are substitutable with one another, which gives technology and 
innovation and important role as natural capital and its ecosystem services decline.1 Due to this 
view, and as stated by Naredo (2003. p. 250): “the problem of [physical] scarcity was reduced to a 
problem of scarcity of capital, considered as an abstract category that could be expressed in 
homogeneous monetary units”. Scarcity of natural resources is then measured only in terms of the 
cost or price of a resource, not in any physical measure of its calculated reserve. Scarcity, in other 
words, is temporary and can be overcome by substitution driven by changes in relative prices. As 
such, economic production is seen as a self-contained circular flow process, without any connection 
to the anthropology, biology or physics of the world (Gowdy and Ferreri Carbonell, 1999). The 
result was that the Neo-classical approach has led many economists away from nature. Or, in other 
words, nature has been ill-served by 20th century mainstream economics (Dasgupta, 2008). 
 
                                                 
1 This is the so-called ‘weak sustainability’ approach: contributions of the natural environment to economic 
activities can be replaced by human made substitutes. In contrast to that approach is the ‘strong sustainability’ 
approach which says that the existing stock of natural capital must be maintained and enhanced because the 
functions it performs cannot be duplicated by human made substitutes.  
12 
 
So, by the second half of the 20th century land or more generally environmental resources, 
completely disappeared from the production function and the shift from land and other natural 
inputs to capital and labor alone, and from physical to monetary and more aggregated measures of 
capital, was completed. As Gowdy and Ferreri Carbonell put it (1999, p. 342): “The hermetic 
nature of production theory has resulted in the neglect of the scale of the impact of the economy 
on the natural world. Neoclassical utility theory is also hermetic in that is sees decisions made by 
individuals as independent of space, time, and the biophysical world. In the neoclassical theory of 
the consumer, only human preferences count. It does not matter where these preferences come 
from or what the consequences for the rest of the world are.”  
 
Likewise, it became a common practice in international trade theory to exclude natural resource-
intensive products from consideration. For example in the factor proportions theory, which explains 
the pattern of comparative advantage by inter-country differences in the relative endowment of 
primary factors of production, the two primary factors of production were capital and labor 
(Hubacek and van den Bergh, 2006).  
 
 Table 3.1 Economic thinking on natural resources 
Period Economic School Conceptualization of 
nature 
Value-environment 
relationship 
19th C. Classical economics Land as production factor 
generating rent (income) 
Labor theory of (exchange) value 
Nature's benefits as use values 
20th C. Neo-classical economics Land removed from the 
production function 
Land as substitutable/ producible 
by capital, and thus monetizable 
Source: Gómez-Baggethun, E., et al., 2009. 
 
This overview of classical and neo-classical economic thinking on natural resources is summarized 
in table 3.1. The economic conception of nature's benefits as use values in Classical economics has 
given way to their conceptualization in terms of exchange values in Neoclassical economics. 
 
 
3.5 Modern economics 
 
The second half of the 20th century experienced a wave of environmentalism that the economic 
discipline could not ignore. Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring was first published in 1962. In 1974 
Lester Brown founded the World Watch Institute as an independent research institute devoted to 
global environmental concerns. This was quickly recognized by opinion leaders around the world for 
its foresight and accessible, fact-based analysis.  
 
In economics specialized sub-disciplines started to address shortcomings in standard economic 
thinking to analyse environmental problems. These sub-disciplines are the subject of the next 
chapter. Here we conclude the historic overview of economic thought with some general notions of 
the environmental problem.  
 
The modern concern with the environment goes much beyond the perennial population problem 
that was addressed by Malthus. The new worries about ecology represent an awakening to a 
hitherto unknown state of human affairs. As Heilbroner (1980) explains: “It is that our abode is a 
vessel of limited capacity for the absorption of the noxious byproducts of production itself. In a 
world, we live on what Kenneth Boulding has aptly called Spaceship Earth. But far from conducting 
our affairs with the infinite care required of the inhabitants of such a vehicle of limited capacity, we 
continue to use up resources and to spew out the residues of productions as if the resources and 
the absorption capacity of the earth were infinite. In Boulding’s phrase, we act as if we lived in a 
Cowboy Economy.”  
 
“We are now in the middle of a long process of transition in the nature of the image which man has of 
himself and his environment. Primitive men, and to a large extent also men of the early civilizations, 
imagined themselves to be living on a virtually illimitable plane. There was almost always somewhere 
beyond the known limits of human habitation, and over a very large part of the time that man has been 
on earth, there has been something like a frontier. That is, there was always some place else to go when 
things got too difficult, either by reason of the deterioration of the natural environment or a deterioration 
of the social structure in places where people happened to live. The image of the frontier is probably one 
of the oldest images of mankind, and it is not surprising that we find it hard to get rid of. (...) Economists 
in particular, for the most part, have failed to come to grips with the ultimate consequences of the 
transition from the open to the closed earth.”  
Source: Boulding, 1966 
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Economists like Boulding inspired thinking about the economic use of limited material, energy, and 
food supplies. This represented a shift from resource allocation in an economic system to the 
interdependency of ecological and economic systems. This view has been extended with the notion 
of ‘ hierarchies of systems’  where the economic system is a subsystem of the social system which 
itself is embedded in the ecosystem. Also, new is the notion of co-evolving processes, which help 
us understand how natural and social systems interconnect and change (Hubacek and Van den 
Bergh, 2006). 
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4. Insights from Environmental and Ecological Economics 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In continuing the explanation of the last section about the environmental problem, this chapter 
presents insights from modern sub-disciplines of economics. First the birth and reasoning of 
Environmental Economics is sketched. This is followed by a discussion of market failures with 
respect to the environment. The basic idea is that economic decisions have impacts on the 
environment influencing social welfare and that these effects should be taken into account 
properly. Next, the chapter presents the critique on the underlying world view of Environmental 
Economics by Ecological Economics, arguing that the economy is fundamentally embedded in the 
natural environment. According to this sub-discipline different ecosystem service values cannot be 
reduced to a single measuring rod in cost-benefit analysis for decision-making. Instead a 
framework of multidimensional evaluation analysis is called for.  
 
 
4.2 Reasoning of Environmental Economics 
 
The discipline of economics tries to analyse how best to fulfil people’s unlimited needs and 
aspirations under scarce resource constraints. As such, economists have studied the original 
endowment of the earth since the beginning of their discipline. Nevertheless, by the second half of 
the 20th century, it became clear that the natural resource assets were under increasing pressures. 
This resulted in the emergence of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics as a distinct field 
(Crocker, 1999).  
 
The first academic community that specialized in the field of environmental economics gathered 
around the Society of Environmental and Resource Economics, whose origins lie in the early 1960s 
(Turner et al., 1994). In those years, and due to increasing environmental problems and the 
emerging environmental policy agenda, the literature on the optimal use of renewable and non-
renewable resources, common property problems, amenities associated with unspoiled natural 
environments, and pollution grew rapidly (Røpke, 2004). As mentioned earlier, one of the kick-
starters was Rachel Carson’s book Silent Spring in 1962 that explained how pesticides were 
causing serious pollution and killing many organisms.  
 
Broadly put, Environmental and Natural Resource Economics (we use hereafter the imprecise but at 
least brief term Environmental Economics) expands the scope of analysis of orthodox Neoclassical 
Economics by developing methods to value and internalize economic impacts on the environment 
into decision making.2  
 
The objective of Environmental Economics is to find the optimal level of an externality (or external 
effect, or external cost), which follows from striving towards optimal social welfare, or Pareto 
efficiency (Van den Bergh, 2001).3 As such, traditional Environmental Economics is based on 
neoclassical welfare theory and microeconomics, in particular on the assumption of rational 
individual behaviour (utility or profit maximisation).  
 
Environmental Economics is an applied, policy-oriented field of inquiry that “… would not exist as 
an identifiable sub-discipline of economics if unfettered competitive markets achieved, on their 
own, economically efficient and socially acceptable allocations of natural resources to economic 
production and consumption plus a clean and healthy environment.” (Bergstrom and Randall, 
2010, p. vii). So, within Environmental Economics, welfare economics took on the study of the 
environment, and focused thereby in particular on: (i) the background of the economic system’s 
allocation system failures (where ‘failure’ means that the system fails to exhaust all potential 
economic surpluses), (ii) the measurement of the surplus foregone due to these failures, and (iii) 
the design of allocation systems capable of realising the foregone surplus (Crocker, 1999).  
 
                                                 
2 Although they have theorems in common, and they share the welfare economic framework and methodology, 
textbooks and scientific articles tend to make distinction between environmental economics and resource 
economics (Røpke, 2004). 
3 Pareto efficiency is defined as a situation in which an improvement in the welfare of any individual cannot be 
achieved without making at least one individual worse off.  
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The basic argument underlying Environmental Economics can be summarized as follows: traditional 
Neoclassical Economics largely neglects the economic contribution of nature by restricting its scope 
of analysis to those ecosystem goods and services that bear a price. After all, the perspective of 
Neoclassical Economics is that the market system is considered to be the preferred institution for 
allocating scarce resources. Ecosystem goods and services are, from this traditional perspective, 
considered to be of economic concern only to the extent that they are considered scarce; i.e. 
demand exceeds supply at zero prices (Hussen, 2013). Hence, the systematic undervaluation of 
the ecological dimension in decision making would be partly explained by the fact that the services 
provided by natural capital are not adequately quantified in terms comparable with economic 
services and manufactured capital (Costanza et al., 1997). From this perspective, non-marketed 
ecosystem services are viewed as positive externalities that, if valued in monetary terms, can be 
more explicitly incorporated in economic decision making.  
 
Stated crudely, the core of Environmental Economics is the theory of externalities. Research in the 
field of Environmental Economics shows that externalities are not exceptional cases, as they are 
often considered in the economic literature, but pervasive and persistent. Moreover, externalities 
become progressively more important, due to population and production growth.   
 
Because natural assets (and thus also ecosystem goods and services) are scarce and increasingly 
exposed to the risk of irreversible degradation, it would be in the best interest of any society to 
manage its natural environmental optimally. This means that ecosystem goods and services should 
be considered taking account of all the social costs and benefits. Whether this could be done 
through the regular operations of the market system, requires a clear and thorough understanding 
of certain complications associated with the assignment of ownership rights to ecosystem services 
(who reaps the benefits of nature?). This will be discussed further in the following subsections.  
 
 
4.3 Market failures 
 
In the presence of externalities, economic pursuit on the basis of individual self-interest does not 
lead to what is best for society as a whole – privately optimal choices may deviate from 
economically efficient choices. These deviations are described as market failures. These occur when 
there is an inefficient allocation of resources in a free market due to the lack of a mechanism to 
account for externalities. There are many different types of market failure. In the context of 
ecosystem services, especially relevant are externalities and public goods. 
 
Externalities 
 
Using the words of Boardman et al. (2006, pp84-85), an externality can be defined as “an effect 
that production or consumption has on third parties – people not involved in the production or 
consumption of the good. It is a by-product of production or consumption for which there is no 
market.” Externalities have been studied by economists ever since the days of Marshall and Pigou. 
Starting from the traditional neoclassical economic framework, the logical way to look at problems 
of environmental pollution is through the prism of externalities (Verhoef, 1999).  
 
Externalities can be positive, i.e. they benefit others, or negative, i.e. they harm others. A positive 
externality exists when an individual who or a firm that makes a decision does not receive the full 
benefit of the decision. In other words, the benefit to the individual or firm is less than the benefit 
to society. Thus when a positive externality exists in an unregulated market, the marginal benefit 
curve (the demand curve) of the individual or the firm making the decision is less than the 
marginal benefit curve to society. As a result, with positive externalities, less is produced and 
consumed than the socially optimal level.  
 
Positive externalities from agricultural production include the conservation of agro-biodiversity and 
the benefits derived from scenic beauty generated by rural landscape and open space. Beekeepers 
can collect honey from their hives, but the bees will also pollinate surrounding fields and thus aid 
farmers. But also: Keeping your yard well maintained helps your house's value and also helps the 
value of your neighbors' homes.  
 
In order to get consumers to consume more of a good that has a positive externality, a subsidy can 
be provided. The subsidy will increase the marginal benefit they receive when they consume the 
good. The subsidy can be paid for by all those who receive the external benefits.  
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A negative externality occurs when an individual or firm making a decision does not have to pay 
the full cost of the decision. If a good has a negative externality, then the cost to society is greater 
than the cost the consumer is paying for it. Since consumers make a decision based on where their 
marginal cost equals their marginal benefit, and since they do not take into account the cost of the 
negative externality, negative externalities result in market inefficiencies – unless proper action is 
taken.  
 
When a negative externality exists in an unregulated market, producers do not take responsibility 
for external costs that exist. These costs are passed on to society. Thus producers have lower 
marginal costs than they would otherwise have and the supply curve is effectively shifted down (to 
the right) of the supply curve that society faces. Because the supply curve is increased, more of 
the product is bought than the efficient amount – that is, too much of the product is produced and 
sold. Since marginal benefit is not equal to marginal cost, a deadweight welfare loss results.  
 
A common and well-known example of a negative externality is pollution. For example, a steel 
producing firm might pump pollutants into the air. While the firm has to pay for electricity, 
materials, etc., the individuals living around the factory will pay for the pollution since it will cause 
them to have higher medical expenses, poorer quality of life, reduced aesthetic appeal of the air, 
etc. Thus the production of steel by the firm has a negative cost to the people surrounding the 
factory – a cost that the steel firm does not have to pay.  
 
Negative externalities are a property rights problem. Who owns the air that the steel mill pollutes? 
Ronald Coase put forth a solution which is known as the Coase Theorem. If there are negligible 
transactions costs, as long as someone owns the rights to the air around the steel mill, the efficient 
outcome will prevail. For example, if the steel mill owns the rights, then the individuals that live 
around the mill will be willing to pay the steel mill not to produce – up to the cost that they are 
incurring from health care, reduced aesthetic appeal of the air, etc. This amount that they are 
willing to pay becomes an opportunity cost for the steel mill if they produce. Thus they will cut 
production to the optimal level. On the other hand, if the people own the air, then the steel mill 
would have to pay them that same amount for the right to produce. Thus the negative externality 
is directly added to the steel mill's marginal cost. So, according to Coase Theorem, bargaining and 
market exchange will lead to an efficient outcome irrespective of how the property rights are 
distributed (Rose and Kverndokk, 1999; Verhoef, 1999).4 
 
Another way to solve the negative externality problem is to simply tax the producer the amount of 
the negative externality. This adds to the producers marginal cost and will cause them to reduce 
output. With the aim to correct alleged market failures, the Environmental Economics literature has 
developed a range of methods to value external environmental costs and benefits. These are dealt 
with in the next chapter. 
 
Public goods and common pool resources 
 
The concepts of externalities and public goods are often lumped together or used interchangeably. 
However, in their comprehensive handbook on the theory and policy implications of externalities, 
Cornes and Sandler (1996) describe and explain the relationship between these two concepts. To 
summarize briefly, externalities represent a variety of market failures of which public goods form a 
member. Also Abler (2004, p. 9) shows that externalities and public goods cannot be seen as 
synonymous. He points out that agriculture produces positive externalities “that do not rise to the 
level of a pure public good. ” As an example, Abler mentions open space, which may increase 
property values on adjacent parcels of land. 
 
Many natural assets, such as species and ecosystems, are characterised by the absence of fully 
defined property rights. Many of these assets are public or collective goods, or possess some 
features associated with such goods. As is summarised in Table 4.1, pure public goods have the 
characteristics of non-rivalry and non-exclusion (for example, Jongeneel and Slangen, 2004; 
Sandberg, 2007; Slangen et al., 2008). 
  
• Non-rivalry: Once the good is provided to a consumer, it can be made available to other 
consumers at no extra cost; that is, the marginal social cost of supplying the asset to an 
additional individual is zero. For example, nature areas protected by or for one agent will 
benefit everyone else who can access the area (Proost, 1999).  
                                                 
4 In practice, however, obstacles to bargaining or poorly defined property rights can prevent Coasian 
bargaining.  
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• Non-exclusion: one user cannot prevent consumption by others. Due to the non-exclusion 
attribute – that is, due to the fact that it is impossible or at least very costly to deny access to 
a natural asset – markets fail to allocate resources with public good characteristics efficiently. 
This may be understood by noting that prices do then not signal the true scarcity of the asset 
(Hanley et al., 1997). 
 
Table 4.1 General classification of economic goods 
 
Excludability 
 
Rivalry 
Low / Absent High 
Easy Toll or club goods (for example water 
storage, nature reserves) 
Private goods (for example 
timber, minerals, food, fish) 
Difficult Pure public goods (for example 
sunsets, climate regulation 
mechanism of the earth’s atmosphere) 
Common-pool resources (for 
example wild game for hunting, 
open access resources ground)* 
 
Note: * Rivalry does not necessarily need to be high. In certain cases, such as rivers, large bodies of 
water or groundwater basins, rivalry is rather medium than high. 
 
Source:  Based on Moretto and Rosato (2002, p. 5, Table 1). 
 
Though many ecosystem goods and services differ from private goods because they possess the 
characteristics of public goods, it needs to be stressed that many public goods are not pure public 
goods. Most natural assets, such as a lake or ocean, a fishing ground, or a forest, are ‘common-
pool resources’. It is difficult or costly to exclude or limit users from these, while one person’s 
consumption reduces resource availability for others (Ostrom, 1999; Ostrom et al., 1999; Steins 
and Edwards, 1999; Ostrom, 2002; 2003; Berkes, 2008). An unit of a common-pool resource 
harvested by one user is thus not available for others. As is shown in Table 4.1, this rivalry of 
resource units is shared with private goods. The difficulty to exclude users, however, is typically a 
public goods property. Table 4.1 also shows that the benefits of both toll goods and pure public 
goods are non-rival so that the consumption by one user does not necessarily detract from the 
benefit still available to other users. However, whereas the toll good is restricted to people who pay 
the producer or the holder of the good, the benefits of a pure public goods are shared by all 
consumers, whether they paid for them or not.  
 
For both common-pool resources and public goods, the problem of excluding beneficiaries can lead 
to substantial free-riding; that is, trying to make individual gains without contributing to 
maintaining and improving the resource itself. Due to free-riding, overexploitation is a potential 
threat to common-pool resources, but absent in regard to pure public goods. The reason for the 
absence of overexploitation in pure public good situations is that one’s use of a pure public good, 
such as climate, does not subtract from the availability of that good to others.  
 
The free-rider problem arises because there is no incentive for people to pay for the good. They 
can, in other words, consume it without paying for it. 
• However this will lead to there being no public good being provided.  
• Therefore there will be social inefficiency. 
• And thus there will be a need for the government to provide it directly out of general 
taxation. 
 
Some goods can be public goods as well as private goods. A good example is hedgerows. Farmers 
have a private incentive to maintain their hedgerows to reduce soil erosion and surface run-off. 
Moreover, hedgerows can play an important role in pest management. But hedgerows also increase 
the cultural, aesthetic and recreational quality of the landscape, thereby delivering public good 
values. So considered, farmers who grow and maintain hedgerows essentially produce a private 
and a public good. This suggests that farmers can provide a certain amount of public good but only 
as far as it is privately optimal to do so. There may be a role for the government to further 
enhance the provision of hedges if it is judged that private provision is below the social optimum. 
 
 
4.4 Criticism from ecological economics 
 
A series of theoretical divergences within the society of Environmental and Resource Economics 
resulted in the emergence of a new transdisciplinary field: Ecological Economics. It was 
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institutionalized with the establishment of the International Society for Ecological Economics in 
1988 and the launch of the first issue of the journal Ecological Economics in 1989 (Røpke, 2005).5  
 
Influenced by the work of researchers from systems ecology, biophysical economics, environmental 
and resource economics, agricultural economics, socio-economics, energy studies and general 
systems theory, the initiators aimed to address “the relationship between ecosystems and 
economic systems in the broadest sense" (Costanza, 1989, p. 1). This aim was based on the view 
that the human economy and ecosystems are much more intertwined than is usually recognised. 
So, whereas neoclassical economists view nature as a subsystem of the economy, ecological 
economists base their theorising on the economy’s embeddedness in nature (see Figure 4.1). 
Compared to neoclassical economists, ecological economists have a much more ‘natural view’ of 
the world, thereby emphasizing natural laws, interdependencies between sectors and systems and 
limits to the material growth of the economy.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Contrasting world views of Environmental (left) and Ecological Economics (right) 
 
Whereas conventional environmental economics applies mainly neo-classical economics to 
environmental and natural resource problems, ecological economics adopts a broadly ‘diversified 
approach’ (Venkatachalam, 2007, p. 550) and relies heavily on a range of relevant natural and 
social sciences. It integrates perspectives from a variety of fields, such as population biology, 
evolutionary biology, genetics and ecology, sociology, fisheries and wildlife management, and 
psychology. Moreover, as Baumgärtner et al. (2008, pp. 385, 386) show, a prominent feature of 
ecological economics is the inter- and transdisciplinary form of science, ‘where interdisciplinarity is 
broadly understood as some kind of cooperation between scientific disciplines, and 
transdisciplinarity as some kind of interrelationship between science and society.’ Short overviews 
of ecological economics are offered by Turner et al. (1997), Spash (1999), van den Bergh (2001), 
and Røpke (2004; 2005). In addition, Costanza (1991), Costanza et al. (1997a), and Dovers et al. 
(2003) provide interesting and helpful textbook surveys of the (inter)discipline of ecological 
economics. 
 
Ecological Economics can be associated with a sustained functioning of the combined ecological-
economic system. For example, with respect to exploiting natural resources, ecological economists 
are particularly concerned with the scale of exploitation relative to the dimensions of the 
ecosystems on which mankind depends. As a result, explicit attention for spatial scales is common 
in many studies (Gowdy and Ferreri Carbonell, 1999). 
                                                      
In order to take account of interrelations between ecological and economic systems, ecological 
economics pays special attention to a wider view of values and conflicts; that is, it is characterised 
by a pluralistic approach to environmental research. This is reflected by the absence of consensus 
on the type of model to frame the interactions between economic and ecological systems.  
 
 
 
                                                 
5 The economists K.E. Boulding, H.E. Daly and N. Georgescu-Roegen – their interests in ecology and 
economics dates back to the 1960s – and the ecologists C.S. Hollilng and H.T. Odum are usually 
regarded as the intellectual founders and antecedents of Ecological Economics. The journal Ecological 
Economics was founded by R. Costanza and H.E. Daly (Van den Bergh, 2001).  
6 Interestingly, Faber (2008) shows that not only neoclassical economics fail to conceptualise nature in 
an adequate manner, but that in many other modern sciences (e.g. philosophy) nature has been also 
neglected.  
The economy 
The environment 
The environment 
The economy 
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Neoclassical economists believe that, in principle, infinite growth is possible. Production and 
consumption can grow forever, because man-made capital can substitute for natural capital. Well-
functioning markets are a crucial condition for this idea of perfect substitution between man-made 
capital and natural resources because they will signal the impending shortage of natural capital, 
stimulating technological progress to invent a substitute (Solow, 1974).  
 
Classical and Neoclassical Economics theories were developed in a time when man-made capital 
was considered to be the resource of greatest relevance to the analysis of scarcity – and economics 
is the discipline that addresses problems of scarcity. Labour and natural resources were relatively 
plentiful in the early development of Classical and Neoclassical Economics. When theoretical 
refinement proceeded, raw materials used as inputs in the production process and any other goods 
and services provided by ecological systems remained omitted from consideration altogether 
(Williams and McNeill, 2005).  
 
Although the differences between Environmental Economics and Ecological Economics remain 
controversial (Turner, 1999), they overlap in the use of specific techniques to measure 
sustainability, evaluate policies and assist decision-making (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010). 
However, the core in Environmental Economics is the theory of (negative) externalities or external 
costs is, whereas Ecological Economics has sustainable development as its central concept (Van 
den Bergh, 2001).  
 
“Within Environmental and Resource Economics, sustainable development is usually regarded as 
being identical to sustainable growth, which is studied with general and abstract models that avoid 
any reference to historical and spatial aspects, as well as specific characteristics of countries. 
Environmental and Resource Economics does not seem to take absolute physical limits to growth as 
seriously as Ecological Economics, and regards the problem of a ‘maximum scale’ of the economy 
as irrelevant.” (Van den Bergh, 2001, p. 15) 
 
Differences between Environmental Economics and Ecological Economics are – somewhat simplified 
– summarized in Table 4.2.  
 
 
Table 4.2  Differences between Environmental Economics and Ecological Economics 
 Environmental Economics  Ecological Economics 
1.  Optimal allocation and externalities Optimal scale 
2.  Priority to efficiency Priority to sustainability 
3.  Optimal welfare or Pareto efficiency Needs fulfilled and equitable distribution 
4.  Sustainable growth in abstract models Sustainable development, globally and North/South 
5.  Growth optimism and ‘win-win’ options Growth pessimism and difficult choices 
6.  Deterministic optimisation of intertemporal 
welfare 
Unpredictable co-evolution 
7.  Short- to medium-term focus Long-term focus 
8.  Partial, monodisciplinary and analytical Complete, integrative and descriptive 
9.  Abstract and general Concrete and specific 
10.  Monetary indicators Physical and biological indicators 
11.  External costs and economic valuation System analysis 
12.  Cost-benefit analysis Multidimensional evaluation 
13.  Applied general equilibrium models with 
external costs 
Integrated models with cause-effect relationships 
14.  Maximisation of utility or profit Bounded individual rationality and uncertainty 
15.  Global market and isolated individuals Local communities 
16.  Utilitarianism and functionalism Environmental ethics 
Source: Van den Bergh (2001, p. 16, Table 1). 
 
Environmental Economics operates mainly within the axiomatic framework of Neoclassical 
economics, formulated in terms of maximization of utility in general, or of profits in particular. It is 
based on neoclassical assumptions and conditions, such as the theory of consumer choice, perfect 
and complete information, and marginal productivity theory of distribution (Van den Bergh et al., 
2000, Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010).  
 
With respect to (monetary) valuation, Environmental Economics focuses on value dimensions, in 
particular on utility and welfare in theory, and costs and benefits in practice. This is quite different 
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in Ecological Economics, where – unlike Neoclassical economics – a total value of changes in nature 
or biodiversity is not regarded as the sum of private values. Rather, Ecological Economics is 
inclined to add ecological concepts to the ‘pure’ economic values. Examples of these concepts are 
‘life support functions’, ‘internal environmental system functions’, ‘ecosystem health’ and ‘resilience 
of ecosystems’ (Van den Bergh, 2001).  
 
So, in order to take account of interrelations between ecological and economic systems, Ecological 
Economics pays special attention to a wider view of values and conflicts; that is, it is characterised 
by a pluralistic approach to environmental research. This is reflected by the fact that there is no 
consensus on one particular type of model to frame the interactions between economic and 
ecological systems.  
 
Some ecological economists have a critical attitude towards cost-benefit analysis. Their criticism 
and opposition is fundamentally based on the fact that environmental decision-making is faced with 
conflicting valuation languages that may not be commensurable in monetary terms (Martínez-Alier, 
2002). Incommensurability signifies the idea that different types of value may not be expressed in 
a common measurement unit (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010) and relies on the philosophical 
foundation of weak comparability of values (Martínez-Alier et al., 1998). Ecological Economists 
maintain therefore critical standpoints towards environmental decision making tools that reduce 
ecosystem service values to a single measuring rod – e.g., cost-benefit analysis. They rather prefer 
a framework of multidimensional evaluation analysis, such as multi-criteria analysis (which 
together with Ecological Economics has gained much popularity).  
 
Moreover, if economic development projects jeopardise ecological systems, the Neoclassical 
criterion of economic efficiency may be regarded as inappropriate and cost-benefit analysis 
becomes irrelevant and other concepts and methods of analysis are opened up. Especially in 
circumstances of great scientific uncertainty, policy makers should err on the side of caution. That 
is, when uncertainty is extreme, safe minimum standards (SMS) and the precautionary principle 
are rational, according ecological economists.  
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5. Valuation of ecosystem services 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The valuation of ecosystem services and the development of appropriate valuation methods have 
aroused considerable interest and controversy in the past decades. Much progress has been made 
in recent years on this subject, which is considered to be essential for sound policy making on 
ecosystem services. Adamowicz (2004) found a dramatic increase over the past 40 years in the 
number of publications using environmental valuation methods. It is noteworthy to mention that 
the trends in publication rates increased rapidly shortly after the Exxon Valdez oil spill in March 
1989.  
 
Decision making by policy makers and nature conservation organisations regarding ecosystem 
services can benefit from the provision of monetary information on the expected virtues, as it 
improves the rationale for spending on such policies. That is, the main reason for undertaking 
monetary valuation of these services is to facilitate cost-benefit analysis and thus to gain insight 
into the playing field between nature conservation and economic development. 
 
Valuation studies of natural assets have mainly been conducted for species preservation, recreation 
and water management. Assigning a monetary value to the benefits of, or avoided damages due 
to, ecosystem services can be done by a number of measurement techniques, based on either 
observed market behaviour (revealed preferences or indirect methods) or stated preferences 
(direct methods). Book-length treatments of these measurement techniques include Garrod and 
Willis (1999), Louviere et al. (2000), Bateman et al. (2002), Mäler and Vincent (2005), and Hanley 
and Barbier (2009). Although based on an appraisal of nature, monetary values are all 
fundamentally anthropocentric, meaning that they are based on the utility of nature to humans. 
 
Essentially, monetary values placed on ecosystem services are rooted in people’s values (Banzhaf, 
2010). The contingent valuation method – which is a stated preference approach – has been 
(most) frequently used for measuring the economic value of natural assets and ecosystem 
services. A main disadvantage though is that this method will fail for those value categories that 
the general public has no experience with or knowledge of (Nunes and van den Bergh, 2001). 
 
Representative overviews of important valuation studies are provided by Brouwer et al. (1999), 
Smith (2000), Nunes and van den Bergh (2001), Nunes et al. (2001), Woodward and Wui (2001), 
Brander et al. (2006), and Ghermandi et al. (2008). McComb et al. (2006) review a number of 
databases which contain a myriad of primary valuation studies and that are accessible to the 
general public through Internet sites.  
 
 
5.2 Categories of values and the concept of total economic value 
 
Most ecosystem services are characterised by the fact that they have no price tag because they are 
not fully captured in markets. There are, however, some exceptions to this rule, which are 
especially related to the provisioning services. Foodstuffs, for example, are generally traded in 
markets. Nevertheless, the fact that for many ecosystem services no market-based price tags exist 
does not imply that these services are of no value. In order to take these values properly into 
account, a framework is required for distinguishing and grouping the various values of an 
ecosystem. The concept of total economic value is such a framework that has been widely used by 
economists to quantify the full value of different ecosystem goods and services (in an area). This 
concept consists of two main elements (Figure 5.1). One element contains the services provided in 
the course of the actual use of an area in consumption and production activities. This is referred to 
as use value. In addition, non-use values involve no tangible interaction between the area under 
consideration and the people who use it for production or consumption. Because non-use values 
are closely linked to ethical concerns and altruistic motives, they are more amenable to debate 
than use values. 
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Figure 5.1 The concept of total economic value (TEV) of an ecosystem 
Source: Turner et al. (1998, p. 13, Figure 2). 
 
For use values, a separation is made between direct and indirect use values. Direct use values are 
concerned with the enjoyment or satisfaction received directly by consumers of the area, which 
involves both commercial and non-commercial activities. Direct uses include both consumptive 
uses (for example, agriculture, water use, hunting, fishing, and the gas mining industry) and non-
consumptive uses (for example, recreation, tourism, and in situ research and education) (Barbier, 
1994). Consumptive use values are conceptually clear and offer the best chance of being 
measurable. After all, they can be marketed, resulting in market prices that signal the (true) 
scarcity of the asset. Non-consumptive use values, however, relate to assets that provide value 
without being traded in the market place and are therefore much more difficult to measure. 
Indirect use values indicate the indirect support to economic activity by natural assets and 
services, and they relate, as such to life-support benefits. Examples of indirect use values include 
stormwater containment and treatment, water purification, watershed protection, soil formation, 
and the decomposition and assimilation of wastes. As such, they are especially related to 
regulating and supporting services. 
 
While use values arise from the use of an area, or ecosystem service, non-use values are 
independent of current or potential use. Non-use values exist where the preferences of individuals 
who do not intend to make use of, say, the Amazon rain forest would nevertheless feel a ‘loss’ if 
the area was to disappear (Perrings 1995; Moran and Pearce 1997). Depending on exact 
definitions, non-use values may include all of the following: option values, quasi-option values, 
bequest values, philanthropic, and existence values.  
 
Option value, a complex and ambiguous concept originally introduced by Weisbrod (1964) as 
relevant for assets that might be difficult to reproduce, has been the subject of considerable debate 
(Smith 1983). It relates to the amount that individuals would be willing to pay today to safeguard 
an ecosystem service for future direct and indirect use. In the economic literature it has been 
suggested that option value represents a difference between ex ante and ex post valuation, where 
the terms ‘ex ante’ and ‘ex post’ refer to the amount of information that is available. Ex ante 
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relates to the situation where the state of the world is still unknown, while ex post refers to the 
situation after the state has been revealed (Bishop 1982; Smith 1983; Freeman 1984; Ready 
1995). If there is uncertainty about the future value of an ecological function, and awaits improved 
information before giving up the option to protect the asset, then there may be quasi-option value 
derived from delaying economic activities.  
 
Quasi-option value, a concept forwarded by Arrow and Fisher (1974), is thus simply the expected 
benefit of awaiting improved information derived from delaying exploitation and conversion of an 
ecosystem service today. It suggests a value attached to protection given the expectation of the 
growth of knowledge (Henry 1974; see also Graham-Tomasi 1995). (Note that in Figure 3, both 
option value and quasi-option value are indicated with a dotted line, since when adding these 
values possible double counting needs to be taken into account.)  
 
Bequest value is a willingness to pay to keep ecosystem services intact for the benefit of one’s 
descendants, or more generally, future generations.  
 
Philanthropic value results from individuals placing a value on the conservation of ecosystem 
services for contemporaries of the current generation to use (Turner et al. 1998).  
 
Existence value involves a subjective valuation as it is based on the satisfaction that individuals 
experience from knowing that certain ecosystem services exist, for themselves and for others, 
without being used now or in the future (Barbier 1995; Wills 1997). Empirical estimates, obtained 
through questionnaires, suggest that existence value can constitute a substantial component of 
total economic value (Moran and Pearce 1997; Alexander 2000).  
 
 
The ‘Total Value of Ecosystem Services’ approach is problematic (Bateman): 
 
• Of no policy use 
• Wrong (total value of ecosystem = infinity) 
 
The approach takes the value of a single unit (the ‘marginal value’) of ecosystem service and 
multiplies by the total number of units. But as the number of units decreases so their marginal 
value increases. 
 
Limitations of economic methodology 
 
• If feasible changes are substantial enough then the marginal values will begin to alter 
• This links the value of service ‘flows’ to the size of the ‘stock’ of ecosystem assets they are 
provided by 
• Need to adjust marginal values for this (tricky) 
• Alternative: Asset check 
• While most ecosystem services can be valued in economic terms, some are problematic 
• While in principle we can estimate the use value of biodiversity (e.g. pollination services, 
bird‐ watching, etc.), the non‐use existence value of conservation is more difficult to 
assess. 
• Efficient use of resources is always necessary, but especially so in times of austerity 
• Integrated environmental economic analysis can target policy so as to optimise efficiency 
and make the most of scarce resources. 
• When Cost Benefit Analysis of environmental policy is not feasible, Cost Effectiveness can 
help target policy 
  
• Advice: an ecological limits approach with economics confined to identifying cost‐effective 
methods of ensuring safe minimum standards (which may be above present levels). 
 
 
5.3 Monetary valuation ecosystem services 
 
Valuation of ecosystem services is controversial because of theoretical and empirical problems, and 
the potential effect of the resulting values on public opinion and policy decisions (Loomis et al. 
2000). For example, biologists such as Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1992), argue that ecosystems are 
complex, indivisible entities that operate on time scales outside the range of human perception, 
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and that they have values that are difficult or impossible to measure (see also Gowdy 1997). Not 
only biologists, but also scholars from other disciplines (and even economists) may find monetary 
valuation a ‘hopeless’ exercise. Philosophers, such as Sagoff (2000) and economists, such as 
Bromley (Vatn and Bromley 1994), dismiss monetary valuation as ethically insupportable and 
impracticable. Nunes and van den Bergh (2001), on the other hand, claim that monetary valuation 
can make sense. However, they point out that the various valuation methods should not be 
considered as universally applicable to all levels of biological diversity or to all types of biodiversity 
values or ecosystem services. 
 
Research on the monetary value of ecosystem services can be motivated by the desire to better 
understand the importance of biodiversity (for a much more elaborate treatment of the need for 
valuation, see, for example, Simpson 2007). Intuitively, the importance of these services to society 
is best represented by monetary values. However, reality is more complicated than the common 
intuition suggests. Economics is more concerned with prices than with values or importance. An 
important difference between prices and values, which is particular relevant for this study, is that 
prices that arise from market transactions offer, in some sense, objective information, whereas 
many concepts of value are subjective (Heal 2000). As a result, valuation cannot be dissociated 
from choice. Economic analysis provides several very measurement techniques to assign a 
(subjective) value to the benefits of, or avoided damage due to, changes in ecosystem services 
(Annex 1)  
 
------- 
Assigning value to nature by putting a price tag on it is not an end in itself. In fact, it is 
just a small cog in the much larger and dynamic political machinery that is influenced by 
a variety of (economic) factors and prevailing cultural and social values. Economists, 
when dealing with nature and biodiversity, generally adopt an anthropocentric view that 
focus on instrumental values (in the sense that these values provide information that 
supports and informs policy making). According to this human-centred view, nature has 
not value in and of itself. Although economists are aware of the ecocentric perspective – 
which defines the value of nature intrinsically as possessing value independently of 
human judgement – they typically concentrate on the question of what nature is worth to 
humans. Also, monetary values are seen and best conceptualised as subjective and 
individual-based, because it is the individuals’ preferences that define value rather than 
that these values are objectively given or defined (Ansink et al., 2008).  
 
According to the neoclassical value theory, value is a marginal concept. It refers to the 
impact of small changes in the state of the world and not the state of the world itself 
(Nunes and van den Bergh, 2001; Baumgärtner, 2006). Marginal value applies best to a 
small change in quantity or quality. Therefore, monetary valuation has a greater chance 
of providing an accurate and reliable estimate of value if the change in nature that is 
being assessed is small relative to the total level of nature in the geographical area of 
interest.  
A controversial study that does not seem to use marginal values has been published by 
Costanza et al. (1997b), who estimate the current economic value of 17 ecosystem 
services on a biosphere-wide basis at between US$ 16 – 54 trillion (1012) per year with 
an average of US$ 33 trillion per year. According to the authors, US$ 33 trillion is 1.8 
times global GNP, which they report as US$ 18 trillion in 1994. Although their paper has 
stimulated a great deal of debate and generated rich methodological discussions, 
Costanza et al.’s estimates are not supportable for various reasons (for a detailed 
critique, see Pearce (1998) and several commentaries in a special issue of Ecological 
Economics (Costanza, 1998). 
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Common errors in economic valuation 
 
While many of the ways in which programs and projects may be assessed are straightforward and 
make common sense, common errors should be avoided (source: Ash, N. et al. Ecosystems and 
human well-being : a manual for assessment practitioners): 
 
• Marginal versus total values. Economic value is determined by how much an additional amount 
of a thing is worth, not how much the thing is worth in total. If an ecosystem service is to be 
reduced but not eliminated, the loss to be estimated is the benefits forgone as a consequence 
of the reduction. 
 
• Substitutes. If there are alternative ways to generate the goods or services of natural 
ecosystems, the value of such goods and services cannot be greater than the cost of the 
alternative. 
 
• Replacement costs. It follows from the above observation that if there are cheaper ways of 
producing a good or service than replacing the system that currently provides it, the cost of 
replacement will overstate the value of the good or service.  
 
• Double-counting. There are often many ways of estimating economic values. Calculating values 
by different methods is sometimes useful to check on against the other, but it is important not 
to count the same value twice. 
 
• Alternative metrics. While embodied energy, ecological footprints, and other physical measures 
may be useful for some purposes, they generally cannot be used in economic valuation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.2 Suitability of valuation methods for the categories of ecosystem services. 
Method Ecosystem service category 
 Provisioning Regulating Cultural Support 
* Market prices + +/- +/- - 
* Revealed preferences +/- - + +/- 
* Stated preferences - - + + 
* Cost approaches + + - +/- 
Explanation: + = suitable; +/- = suitable in certain circumstances; - = not or hardly suitable.  
Source: Based on Pascual et al. (2010). 
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6. Policy analysis and design 
 
 
6.1 Tools   
 
Because of the inescapable reality of scarcity, but also because resources – be they financial, 
human or natural – have alternative uses, the efficient use of these resources requires both 
consumers and producers to weigh alternatives (that is, to make trade-offs). Economics can 
provide guidance on how to approach these trade-offs. Environmental economics aims to elucidate 
the trade-offs between ecological, economic and social systems.  
 
There are a number of tools for the evaluation of alternatives: cost assessments, cost-effectiveness 
analysis, cost-benefit analysis, social cost-benefit analysis and multi-criteria analysis.   
 
Cost assessment (CA): CA assesses the costs of an alternative on businesses, consumers, and 
workers. Here benefits are ignored. The assessment may include an attempt to ensure that cost 
levels are not too high. Advantage is that the approach attempts to comprehensively determine the 
total price and provides insight into its economic feasibility. The approach is not partial and does 
not provide comprehensive guidance as benefits are ignored.  
 
Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA):  CEA calculates the cost per unit benefit but does not assign 
monetary value to objectives. This approach eliminates the difficulty of attempting to value all 
benefits explicitly, at the same time providing comparisons of the costs of different ways of 
achieving a particular objective. It is particularly useful in weeding out alternatives that are clearly 
inferior, as it provides an index of the relative efficacy of policies in generating benefits. 
Disadvantage is that the approach takes as a given the desirability of achieving a particular benefit, 
and therefore it does not resolve the choice of the optimal level of benefits. 
 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA): CBA calculates the total benefits and total costs and if the benefits 
exceed the costs the alternative should be chosen. The advantage of the approach is that it reflects 
both favourable and adverse effects. The disadvantage is that some important benefit components 
may not be quantified and consequently given less weight. 
 
Social Cost-Benefit Analysis (SCBA). SCBA is an instrument facilitating the weighing up of all 
current and future social advantages and disadvantages of various alternatives. The word ‘social’ 
indicates that costs and benefits are analysed and valued from the point of view of society as a 
whole. The focus is not only on the costs and benefits that can be expressed in monetary terms, 
but also on the costs and benefits which have not (or not yet) been expressed in monetary terms, 
relating to all kinds of other matters valued by society, such as the environment. 
 
Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA): MCA is based on various preferences of criteria (i.e. importance of 
indicators) that are used for the choice of an alternative. The analysis shows the contribution of the 
alternatives to the criteria, based on the weights (preferences) that are given.  
 
 
6.2  Cost-effectiveness analysis 
 
The purpose of cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) is to create a basis for sound decisions about the 
allocation of scarce resources. CEA can take two forms. The first is the called the ‘least cost 
method’. Where there are alternative options to achieve a specific target, CEA can be used to 
assess the cheapest way of achieving that target. The second method is known as the ‘constant 
cost method’. It assumes a fixed budget and seeks the alternative that will result in the maximum 
effect on a specific target variable from those given resources. Developed in the military, CEA is 
nowadays widely used in the health and environmental sectors (for some environmental-economic 
examples, see Turner et al., 1994; Macmillan et al., 1998; Ison et al. 2002).  
 CEA is very much related to cost-benefit analysis (CBA).  Both CEA and CBA are evaluative 
tools of comparing the advantages (benefits) and disadvantages (costs) of the alternatives under 
consideration (van Huylenbroeck, 1988). However, whereas CBA is a decision-making technique 
used for selecting projects that maximise the economic value to society, CEA is usually preferred 
when policy makers are unable to monetise the project’s benefits. CEA is primarily used as an ex 
ante tool for evaluating competing project alternatives on the basis of their costs and a single 
quantified objective. As benefits of natural goods and services often have no price tag, it is not 
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surprising that CEA is increasingly used as an evaluation method in the fields of environmental and 
ecological economics. 
 Because of the lack of a cut-and-dried estimate of the monetary value of the target 
variable, CEA can be criticised for the limitation that it does not provide an unambiguous answer to 
whether a project is worth undertaking. In other words, CEA can only give relative answers. 
Another obvious problem for CEA is that it compares apples and oranges if the benefits that result 
from alternative activities are not measured in comparable units. Therefore, in order to make direct 
comparison of the indices possible, we will determine for each ecological index the effect per euro. 
Furthermore, in some environmental applications of CEA, the targets or objectives can be simply 
measured in terms of a certain standard (for example, target reduction in tonnes of CO2 
emissions). However, in other cases, such as ecosystem restoration, the objective is extremely 
difficult to define because it is intangible (Macmillan et al., 1998).  
 Despite these limitations, CEA can serve as a useful guide for evaluating policy scenarios. 
As it links the outcomes of the ecological indices with their costs, CEA offers the potential – at the 
ex ante stage of policy making – of identifying financial resource savings. Hence, CEA can reveal 
useful insights as to how nature policy measures can be implemented efficiently. 
 
 
6.3 Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) 
 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is the conventional neoclassical economic approach to quantifying and 
evaluating projects (Moran et al., 1996; Drèze and Stern, 1987). The technique incorporates clear 
principles for assessing the net difference between the net monetary investment costs and benefits 
over the lifetime of an investment. The main criterion for project appraisal is economic efficiency, 
which under certain conditions is assured by applying CBA. Nevertheless, if applied properly, CBA 
can play an important role in legislative and regulatory policy debates on protecting nature and its 
ecosystem services. CBA provides a useful framework for consistently organising disparate 
information – without double-counting –, which greatly improves the process and outcome of policy 
analysis (Arrow et al., 1996). Traditionally, CBA has been defined in terms of what the gains and 
losses are to society, and therefore the method offers an aid to decision makers in evaluating 
public sector projects or projects with non-market environmental consequences (see Hanley and 
Spash, 1993). It should be realised, however, that CBA cannot replace political judgement. 
 
Although cost-benefit analysis is a widely practised technique of project appraisal, there are a 
number of difficulties posed by applying it to ecosystem services issues (see Hanley and Spash, 
1993; Perman et al., 1996; Pindyck, 2000).  
• First, as already mentioned, many ecosystem services possess the characteristics of public 
goods. As a result, there are inherent problems in measuring benefits and costs in 
monetary terms.  
• Second, determination of society’s discount rate appears to be extremely difficult, whereas 
the outcome is usually very sensitive to its precise value (see, for example, Porter, 1982; 
Turner et al., 1994).  
• Third, as CBA is an incremental procedure, it values small changes in ecosystem services.  
• Fourth, CBA implies that the value of something is always relative to something else. 
Critics, however, argue that nature possesses intrinsic value. Their value cannot be 
measured relative to other things (OECD, 2002).  
• Fifth, CBA does not consider differences between one person’s valuation of nature and 
another’s. The fact that each person’s valuation receives the same weight is among 
ecologists one of the most important criticisms of CBA (Goulder and Kennedy, 1997).  
• Finally, conducting a cost-benefit analysis of a policy having significant ecological 
implications requires detailed knowledge of ecosystem functioning and complexity as well 
as (ir)reversibility of ecological changes. Unfortunately, this knowledge is often incomplete 
and qualitative in nature (Prato, 1999; Turner et al., 2000). Traditional CBA is not equipped 
to address issues of ecological irreversibility and foregone preservation benefits, and 
therefore, adaptations of the technique are required in performing an evaluation of major 
decisions regarding ecological and environmental issues. 
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6.4 Multi Criteria Analysis (MCA) 
 
The purpose of multicriteria analysis (MCA), or multicriteria decision analysis (MCDA), is to indicate 
the best alternative that satisfies a pre-determined set of objectives (van Huylenbroeck, 1988).7 It 
can be used to identify a single most-preferred option, to generate a ranking, or simply to 
distinguish acceptable from unacceptable alternatives. In contrast to CEA, MCA allows the 
comparison of projects that seek to reach different objectives. For the set of objectives, the policy 
maker has established measurable criteria to assess the extent to which the objectives have been 
achieved. MCA makes the alternative options and their contribution to the different criteria explicit. 
The technique usually provides an explicit relative weighting system for the different criteria 
(Janssen and Munda, 1999). The emphasis of MCA on the judgement of the policy maker in 
establishing objectives and criteria and in estimating relative importance weights can be a matter 
of concern. After all, the outcome of MCA is, in principle, affected by the decision maker’s own 
choices of objectives, criteria, weights, and assessments of achieving the objects.8 However, MCA 
is an open and explicit evaluation technique; the choice of objectives, criteria, scores and weights 
can be amended if necessary. Besides the potential problem of subjectivity, another limitation of 
MCA is that it does not reveal whether the implementation of a project adds more to welfare than it 
detracts. In MCA, there is no necessity that benefits should exceed costs. In other words, unlike 
cost-benefit analysis (CBA), there is no explicit rationale for a Pareto improvement rule that 
benefits should exceed costs. Thus in MCA, as is also the case with CEA, the most-preferred option 
can be inconsistent with improving welfare.9 Extensive reviews of MCA are given in van 
Huylenbroeck (1988) and Janssen (1991); for a technical introduction to MCDA, see Vincke (1992). 
 As MCA can be regarded as a tool for analysing complex problems that are characterised by 
several – often conflicting and contradictory – points of view, it enables a nature policy maker to 
advance in solving a decision problem where a mixture of monetary and non-monetary objectives 
must be taken into account. 10 It needs stressing, however, that there does not exist, in general, 
one scenario that will be obviously best in achieving all objectives, because some trade-off is 
evident amongst the objectives. 
 
Unfortunately, these standardisation procedures do not lead to identical results: the final ranking of 
scenarios may be influenced by the type of standardisation applied. Nevertheless, despite the 
dependence on the standardisation procedure, the weighted summation method is a useful 
instrument for a complete ranking of the scenarios and for providing information on the relative 
differences between them. 
 It is clear that in MCA the ordering of scenarios is dependent on (politically determined) 
weights for the successive criteria. The set of weights incorporates information about the relative 
importance of the criteria; that is, the weights describe quantitatively how important each criterion 
is with respect to the other criteria. Obviously, the criterion with the greatest importance has the 
highest weight. Establishing subjective weights reflects decision makers’ or interest groups’ 
preferences. It is therefore expected that different weights on the criteria will lead to different 
outcomes of the MCA. 
 
 
OEEI method (Ministry of Transport and Water Management / Ministry of Finance, 2000, Evaluation 
of infrastructure projects, Manual for cost-benefits analysis, Research programme Economic 
Consequences of Infrastructure). This does not permit the financial valuation of many landscape 
functions. 
 
Witteveen en Bos has developed the ‘Kentallenboek’ (Ministry LNV, 2006, Kentallen waardering 
Natuur, Water, Bodem en Landschap). 
                                                 
7 Although the terms ‘multicriteria analysis’ and ‘multi-attribute analysis’ are often used synonymously in the 
literature, we prefer to use the former. The terms ‘multicriteria analysis’ (MCA) and ‘multicriteria decision 
analysis’ (MCDA) do not have a very distinct meaning. They are frequently used interchangeably. 
8 This is in contrast to cost-benefit analysis (CBA), which is based on the preferences of all the consumers on 
whose behalf the CBA is being undertaken (Rietveld, 2002). 
9 Another important distinction between MCA and CBA is that the risk of double counting is much smaller in CBA 
than in MCA (Rietveld, 2002). Moreover, whereas distributional considerations are absent in standard CBA, they 
can be included in MCA as one or more criteria.  
10 In order to deal with effective decision making on complex problems, such as environmental problems, 
various computer programmes that are easy to use have been developed to assist the technical aspects of MCA 
(see, e.g., Janssen et al., 2000). 
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6.5 Safe minimum standards approach and the precautionary principle  
 
 
The fundamental policy goal for which economic values of natural assets needs to be considered 
carefully is priority setting (OECD, 2002). Saving all biological resources is impossible, if only for a 
lack of funding. Setting protection priorities is thus inevitable, leading to the question how most 
species can be supported or how a given amount of biodiversity can be protected against least 
cost. It is often emphasised that a great deal of effort and many financial resources should be 
directed at the scarcest or most threatened species (see, for example, Myers et al., 2000).  
 
However, overemphasis on the degree of threat of extinction ignores the reason why the 
biodiversity is severely threatened in the first place. Hence, if policy measures do not address the 
fundamental causes of extinction, the allocation of resources to conservation is likely to be 
wasteful. Economists therefore maintain that a more sound conservation strategy would focus on 
the largest amount of conservation for a given level of expenditure; that is, they suggest an 
approach based on cost-effectiveness rather than scarcity (Moran et al., 1997). Given the fact that 
financial resources are limited, the concept of opportunity cost occupies the central place. As any 
practical decision-making criterion has to account for the benefits that are sacrificed by nature 
conservation, it is a task of economists to assist in setting priorities among alternative nature 
policy and management options. This involves a formal procedure, notably cost-benefit analysis 
(OECD, 2002). 
 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is the conventional neoclassical economic approach to quantifying and 
evaluating projects (Moran et al., 1996; Drèze and Stern, 1987). The technique incorporates clear 
principles for assessing the net difference between the net monetary investment costs and benefits 
over the lifetime of an investment. The main criterion for project appraisal is economic efficiency, 
which under certain conditions is assured by applying CBA. Nevertheless, if applied properly, CBA 
can play an important role in legislative and regulatory policy debates on protecting nature and 
biodiversity. CBA provides a useful framework for consistently organising disparate information – 
without double-counting –, which greatly improves the process and outcome of policy analysis 
(Arrow et al., 1996). Traditionally, CBA has been defined in terms of what the gains and losses are 
to society, and therefore the method offers an aid to decision makers in evaluating public sector 
projects or projects with non-market environmental consequences (see Hanley and Spash, 1993). 
It should be realised, however, that CBA cannot replace political judgement. 
 
Although cost-benefit analysis is a widely practised technique of project appraisal, there are a 
number of difficulties posed by applying it to ecological and nature issues (see Hanley and Spash, 
1993; Perman et al., 1996; Pindyck, 2000). First, as already mentioned, many of the natural 
assets possess the characteristics of public goods. As a result, there are inherent problems in 
measuring benefits and costs in monetary terms. Second, determination of society’s discount rate 
appears to be extremely difficult, whereas the outcome is usually very sensitive to its precise value 
(see, for example, Porter, 1982; Turner et al., 1994). Third, as CBA is an incremental procedure, it 
values small changes in the stock of biological diversity. Fourth, CBA implies that the value of 
something is always relative to something else. Critics, however, argue that nature possesses 
intrinsic value. Their value cannot be measured relative to other things (OECD, 2002). Fifth, CBA 
does not consider differences between one person’s valuation of nature and another’s. The fact that 
each person’s valuation receives the same weight is among ecologists one of the most important 
criticisms of CBA (Goulder and Kennedy, 1997). Finally, conducting a cost-benefit analysis of a 
policy having significant ecological implications requires detailed knowledge of ecosystem 
functioning and complexity as well as (ir)reversibility of ecological changes. Unfortunately, this 
knowledge is often incomplete and qualitative in nature (Prato, 1999; Turner et al., 2000). 
Traditional CBA is not equipped to address issues of ecological irreversibility and foregone 
preservation benefits, and therefore, adaptations of the technique are required in performing an 
evaluation of major decisions regarding ecological and environmental issues. 
 
Krutilla and Fisher (1975) proposed an approach to handle the irreversible effects that many 
economic development projects have. Consider, for example, a project to build an industrial estate 
in a nature area. The net benefits of development are then usually calculated by the gross benefit 
from the project less the costs associated with the project. All projects with a the net present value 
(NPV) greater than zero adds to the welfare of society and should, in principle, be undertaken. The 
traditional calculation of this net present value of the project at time t  is given by  
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where C is the initial costs of the project, i is the social rate of time preference and D is an infinite, 
constant series of benefits D per annum. However, the development of an industrial estate 
destroys any benefit society might have derived from the continued nature area in an undisturbed 
state. Therefore, the foregone benefits of destruction of the environment as a natural asset should 
also be included. So, the present value calculation must then include the foregone flow of benefits 
of protection, P. Now, the NPV becomes 
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Rearranging equation (3.2), the development project is only admissible if  
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Benefits of protection are likely to increase over time as the natural environment decreases in 
quantity, so that its ‘scarcity rent’ increases. In addition, the demand for nature can grow, for 
example, due to an increase in income and expenditures, higher education levels, and improved 
knowledge and understanding of the importance of ecosystems and biological diversity. The 
benefits of protection may thus also grow, e.g. at a positive annual rate, r. Benefits of economic 
development will neither be perpetual. Especially the force of continuous technological progress will 
reduce the costs of existing, or even introduce entirely new, competitive technologies, thus eroding 
the benefits of the current economic project. This is represented by the annual rate of decline in 
development benefits, g.  
 Thus, assuming that g is negative and r is positive and including these two annual rates in 
equation (3.3), the net present value is 
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Equation (3.4) is a statement of the Krutilla-Fisher model of irreversible development. The Krutilla-
Fisher approach ensures that the benefits of nature protection are correctly included in the basic 
cost-benefit equation. As Porter (1982) shows, for given values of P, D, g and r, the sign of the 
present value depends on the discount rate i that is used. Economic development will only be 
profitable if certain discount rates are adopted. High discount rates simply reduce the value of D, 
i.e. the benefits the development project yields are too heavily discounted to offset the initial cost 
of the project. Low rates result in preservation benefits to dominate. 
 
The Krutilla-Fisher model is an interesting approach to irreversible economic development. Another 
line of economic thinking on irreversible changes has been followed by Arrow and Fisher (1974), 
who developed the concept of a ‘quasi-option value’,  the expected value of the information derived 
from delaying exploitation (see also Henry, 1974). As such, it is based on the uncertain future 
benefits, rather than on discounted net benefits. The essence of quasi-option value is that it 
attaches a value to nature conservation given the expectation of the growth of knowledge 
(Graham-Tomasi, 1995). Even when more informative research reveals that the maintenance of a 
nature area is less valuable than initally thought, the mere prospect of getting better information in 
the future can lead to greater conservation of the area. It should be realised that the option to 
postpone the economic exploitation has value only because decision makers are assumed to learn 
about future benefits of conservation by waiting. Moreover, decision makers are assumed to have 
the flexibility to postpone the exploitation so that they can progress towards fuller information.  
 
The quasi-option value in the environmental literature coincides with the option value of the theory 
of investment under uncertainty by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) (see Fisher, 2000a). It is dynamic, 
not dependent on risk aversion and nonnegative. Graham-Tomasi (1995) reviews some of the 
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literature on quasi-option value and concludes that, although the concept is fundamental to 
problems of resources use, the difficulty lies in empirical treatments. 
 
There are a number of problems with the Krutilla-Fisher algorithm (see Hanley and Spash, 1993). 
First, although it is common in empirical studies to approximate the growth rate of preservation 
benefits by the growth rate in real per capita income, and the rate of depreciation of development 
benefits by the rate of technological progress, these two growth rates may be different and 
generally unpredictable. Second, the initial benefits of especially nature conservation are not easily 
quantifiable and therefore difficult to estimate. Third, there is uncertainty about the preferences of 
the individual in the future. That is, foregone conservation benefits are measured using the 
preferences of current individuals, which may not reflect the preferences of future generations. 
Finally, the Krutilla-Fisher algorithm leads to a rather conservation-oriented rule, one which – due 
to its CBA basis – is arrived at entirely on the grounds of economic efficiency. Most nature policy 
programmes, however, also deal with other goals, such as equity and sustainability, and the trade-
offs between them.  
 
All in all, the Krutilla-Fisher algorithm is modest in its way of ecological-economic integration. 
Further adjustments can be undertaken by adding ecological constraints to the approach, reflecting 
ecological thresholds and current knowledge of the relationship between ecosystem stability and 
biodiversity. In modelling terms this would then give rise to a constrained dynamic optimisation 
approach.  
 
The safe minimum standards approach 
 
If economic development projects jeopardise ecological systems, the criterion of economic 
efficiency may be regarded as inappropriate. The reason for this is that efficiency supposes a level 
of accuracy of analysis, policy setting, policy implementation, and enforcement that is unrealistic. 
In the context of nature policy this is particularly the case as the ecological effects of current 
economic activities are complex, incompletely understood and subject to variable external 
influences outside the control of humans – think of climatic dynamics. This problem is magnified 
because the consequences of current losses of nature extend far into the future. Among others, 
this leads to information problems, which cover ignorance about not only environmental processes 
but also the identity and personal preferences of those who suffer from nature loss in the future as 
well as about future technologies and resource costs (Wills, 1997). If striving for efficiency is no 
longer realistic, CBA becomes irrelevant and other concepts and methods of analysis are opened 
up. 
 
When scientific uncertainty is extreme, a precautionary principle is rational (Gollier et al., 2000).11 
This precautionary principle particularly relates to ecological uncertainty – for example, evolution of 
ecosystems, global warming and loss of biodiversity – rather than to economic uncertainty – for 
example, business cycles and macroeconomic stability (van den Bergh, 2001; Pindyck, 2000). The 
precautionary principle implies that where significant or irreversible ecological risks are involved, 
any lack of scientific evidence with respect to cause and effect should not be used as a reason for 
avoiding taking appropriate action to prevent ecological degradation. For instance, a precautionary 
approach to biodiversity loss would involve, for example, measures to reduce habitat 
fragmentation, despite uncertainty about the exact extinction rates due to the fragmentation 
process, or about the (cumulative) effects of species loss on the benefits that human populations 
derive, directly or indirectly, from them. 
 
In the context of nature policy the safe minimum standard (SMS) of conservation has been 
proposed to prevent as best as possible major irreversibilities (Perrings et al., 1992; Randall and 
Farmer, 1995; Crowards, 1998). An SMS approach to nature conservation represents a decision-
making principle which suggests that there be a presumption in favour of not harming the natural 
environment unless the costs of that action are intolerably high (Randall and Farmer, 1995; OECD, 
1999). Some argue this concept, which was introduced by Ciriacy-Wantrup in the 1950s and 
adopted and revitalised by Bishop (1978) in the 1970s, bridges the gap between economists and 
ecologists (see Spash, 1999). The SMS defines the level of preservation that ensures survival and 
implies a conservative approach to risk bearing (Randall, 1988). In effect, deciding to conserve 
today can be shown to be the risk-minimising way to proceed given the presence of uncertainty 
about the consequence of nature loss (Tisdell, 1991; Hanley et al., 1997). Due to scientific 
                                                 
11 Various contributions to ecological uncertainty are provided in a special issue of Resource and Energy 
Economics on irreversibilities (Fisher, 2000b). 
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uncertainty about the consequences of using natural assets, an SMS approach shifts the burden of 
proof from those who wish to conserve to those who wish to develop (Randall and Farmer, 1995; 
Norton and Toman, 1997). The SMS approach is related to the precautionary principle, but it 
permits more scope for economic development. The barriers to economically rational actions that 
threaten the natural environment are under an SMS lower than when the precautionary principle is 
adopted (Wills, 1997; van Kooten and Bulte, 2000). 
 
The virtue of the SMS approach in circumstances of great uncertainty is that it places natural 
assets beyond the reach of routine trade-offs. Unfortunately, the approach also has some 
problems. Perhaps the most serious limitation of safe minimum standards is that the priorities for 
nature conservation depend solely on the costs of conservation. That is, it disregards the scientific 
information available about benefits (Wills, 1997). Furthermore, in order to make the concept of 
SMS operational, two aspects require special attention: the determination of the principles that 
identify a safe minimum standard, and the specification of what cost level is considered 
unacceptably high. Decisions regarding these two aspects, however, are arbitrary and thus 
political. As a result, the outcomes of a safe minimum standards approach depend very much on 
the societal or interest-group preferences of the persons who make these decisions (Turner et al., 
1999). If the responsible decision maker and his or her incentives remain the same, SMS is likely 
to lead to similar decisions to CBA. Both methods, after all, then rely on the same individual 
subjective preferences. 
 
Cost-benefit analysis and the monetary valuation of costs and benefits are controversial. 
Nevertheless, economists commonly use cost-benefit analysis in their identification and evaluation 
of public and private projects, and even government programmes, arguing that money should only 
be spent on a particular item only if the total benefits exceed the total costs. One of the 
fundamental criteria in cost-benefit analysis is economic efficiency, measured as the difference 
between benefits and costs. Because society has limited financial resources to spend on nature 
policy, cost-benefit analysis can inform decisions about how scarce resources can be put to the 
greatest social good. Such an analysis thus aids in the selection of projects by illuminating the 
inevitable trade-offs involved in making different kinds of investments. It needs stressing that cost-
benefit analysis leaves the final decision to the political process. In this regard, the politician needs 
not to choose the project or program that is most efficient as calculated by economists.  
 
The Krutilla-Fishter algorithm adds a few ecological considerations to the cost-benefit analysis as it 
explicitly recognises asymmetric growth rates in economic development and nature protection 
benefits. The fundamental point of the Krutilla-Fisher algorithm is its rejection of the view that the 
profitability of a project is an adequate criterion for acceptability when it destroys ecological values. 
The safe minimum standards approach and the precautionary principle represent other 
supplements to cost-benefit analysis and stress the uncertainty of decisions about nature; that is, 
the difficulty of knowing what may be being lost. They both imply that natural assets have 
substantial value, even if that value is not measurable. The SMS, which allows more scope for 
economic development than the strict precautionary principle, emphasises the protection of nature 
by minimising maximum possible losses to society wherever thresholds of irreversible damage are 
threatened and uncertainty over the benefits of nature protection exists. 
 
 
6.6 Design  
 
A major challenge for science and policy is to guide stakeholders in dealing with potentially 
conflicting uses of natural resources. Giller et al. describe an interdisciplinary and interactive 
approach for: (i) the understanding of competing claims and stakeholder objectives; (ii) the 
identification of alternative resource use options, and (iii) the scientific support to negotiation 
processes between stakeholders. Central to the outlined approach is a shifted perspective on the 
role of scientific knowledge in society. Understanding scientific knowledge as entering societal 
arenas and as fundamentally negotiated, the role of the scientist becomes a more modest one, a 
contributor to ongoing negotiation processes among stakeholders. Scientists can, therefore, not 
merely describe and explain resource-use dynamics and competing claims, but in doing so, they 
should actively contribute to negotiation processes between stakeholders operating at different 
scales (local, national, regional, and global). Together with stakeholders, they explore alternatives 
that can contribute to more sustainable and equitable use of natural resources and, where possible, 
design new technical options and institutional arrangements. 
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The analysis of competing claims on natural resources: an iterative cycle of stakeholder 
negotiated research phases (NE-DEED). 
 
Giller, K. E., C. Leeuwis, J. A. Andersson, W. Andriesse, A. Brouwer, P. Frost, P. Hebinck, I. Heitkönig, M. 
K. van Ittersum, N. Koning, R. Ruben, M. Slingerland, H. Udo, T. Veldkamp, C. van de Vijver, M. T. van 
Wijk, and P. Windmeijer. 2008. Competing claims on natural resources: what role for science?. Ecology 
and Society 13(2): 34. [online] URL: http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol13/iss2/art34/ 
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Annex 1 
 
Methods for valuing ecosystem services 
 
 
Non-demand approaches 
 
Following Bateman and Turner (1993), two basic approaches are distinguished: those which value an 
ecosystem service via a demand curve (see the following subsection), and those which do not. In 
general, non-demand approaches are based on the principle assumption that if people incur costs to 
avoid damages caused by lost services (such as the pollination of agricultural crops by bee species) or to 
replace ecosystem services, then the value of those services are worth at least the amount of money 
that people have paid to replace them. There are a number of non-demand approaches, such as the 
opportunity cost approach, the dose response approach, the preventative expenditure approach, the 
averting behaviour approach, and the replacement cost approach (see, for example, Turner et al. 1994, 
and Garrod and Willis 1999).  
 
Demand approaches: revealed preference and stated preference methods 
 
Demand curve approaches are broadly divided into revealed preference and stated preference methods. 
The first type of approach seeks to elicit preferences (for ecosystem services) by examining the 
purchases of related goods or services in the private market place. In other words, revealed preference 
methods use market information (such as travel costs or the price of housing) as a proxy to estimate the 
benefits from a certain (nature) area.  
 
Stated preference methods consider a change in the quantity or quality of ecosystem services and, by 
using survey techniques, they seek to directly measure the value of these changes (Perrings 1995; 
Garrod and Willis 1999; van der Heide et al. 2003). As such, these methods derive a value by simulating, 
or constructing a hypothetical market for the service in question. Although economists are generally 
much more comfortable with valuations based on actual transactions and observed behaviour in markets 
than those given in response to survey questionnaires (Heal 2000), for some ecosystem services there 
are simply no accurate means of inferring preferences from observations. In such circumstances, there 
are no viable alternatives to asking individuals how much they would be willing to pay for a ecosystem 
service or accept in compensation for its loss in a hypothetical situation of payment. 
 
Travel cost method 
 
The travel cost method (TCM), a revealed preference method, is one of the oldest valuation methods 
employed by environmental economists (Clawson and Knetsch 1966). It is especially useful for assessing 
the value of outdoor recreation in natural parks, and to this end, it has been widely used in the USA and 
to a lesser extent the UK (Perrings 1995). The underlying assumption of the TCM is that the incurred 
costs of visiting a national park, nature reserve, open space or any other recreational site are directly 
related to the benefits individuals derive from the amenities within the area, such as hiking, camping, 
fishing, bird watching and, swimming. The method involves using the value of time spent in travelling, 
the cost of travel (e.g., petrol costs) and entrance and other site fees as a proxy for computing the 
demand price of the ecosystem service. TCM is primarily concerned with recreation and tourism values 
and application for valuing anything other than recreational values is rather limited. That is, the method 
is well suited to assessing values related to leisure and recreation – i.e. cultural services – but it is 
incapable of assessing other ecosystem services, such as flood control or the contribution to climatic 
stability. Although TCM is uncontroversial and widely used by government agencies in the United States, 
it has its own limitations, which have been addressed extensively in the literature (for example Bateman 
1993; Hanley and Spash 1993; Turner et al. 1994; Smith 1997; OECD 2002). For example, the method 
is only capable of estimating use values, not non-use values, as these are – by definition – not 
associated with any measurable activity. It should be observed that the TCM results in a perverse 
outcome if travelling to and entering area becomes so expensive that no one decides to go there. The 
method would reveal that the value of the area, or the price the public would be willing to pay to secure 
this form of land use, is zero (Perrings 1995, Shechter 2000). For an extensive discussion of the TCM, 
particularly its history and scope, the underlying demand and benefits theory, design principles and 
administration of surveys, measurement of variables, data management and analysis and various 
applications we refer to Ward and Beal (2000). 
 
Hedonic pricing method 
 
The hedonic pricing method (HPM) derives the value of environmental amenities from actual market 
prices of some private goods. Just like the travel cost method, the HPM is based on observed behaviour. 
By far the most common application of HPM is to the real estate market. House prices are affected by 
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many factors, not only by house characteristics like the number of rooms and the size of the garden, but 
also by the environmental quality of the surroundings, including proximity to natural areas and the 
quality and uniqueness of such areas. If the non-environmental factors can be controlled for, then the 
remaining differences in real estate prices are expected to be the result of environmental differences 
(Turner et al. 1994). In principal, HPM is suitable for the estimation of changes in ecosystem services, 
but is especially appropriate for assessing noise and air pollution (Spash and Carter 2002). A number of 
problems (including statistical problems such as multicollinearity) are associated with hedonic pricing. 
These are discussed in detail in Bateman (1993), Hanley and Spash (1993), and Garrod and Willis 
(1999). 
 
Contingent valuation method 
TCM and HPM are both revealed preference methods. A common problem with these methods is that in 
the absence of appropriate data or interdependent market goods, assessing the value of ecosystem 
services is either not possible or will lead to spurious results. Stated preference methods bypass the need 
to refer to market prices by asking people directly what their willingness to pay (WTP) for a change in 
ecosystem services is. This requires the presentation of a change scenario, for example the conversion of 
agricultural land into a wetland that filters and regulates water levels, or the establishment of new 
forests to enhance carbon sequestration.  
 
The contingent valuation method (CVM) is the most used stated preference method: there are now 
thousands of papers and studies dealing with the topic (Carson 2000; for an overview of fifty years of 
CVM, see Smith 2004). CVM has been used extensively in the valuation of biological resources, including 
rare and endangered species, habitats and landscapes, and ecosystem services, although it should be 
recognised that this method may fail for those value categories that the general public has no experience 
with (Nunes and van den Bergh 2001). It invokes a framework of a contingent (or hypothetical) market, 
used to indicate what individuals are willing to pay for a beneficial change or what they are willing to 
accept by way of compensation to tolerate an undesirable change (Garrod and Willis 1999; Carson 2000; 
Carson and Hanemann 2005; Boardman et al. 2006). 
 
The main advantage of CVM is that, in theory and to varying degrees, it is capable of capturing most of 
the value categories related to the functions nature areas. The hypothetical nature of CVM offers 
flexibility in application, and as a result, the method is quite versatile. Nevertheless, results from CVM 
studies are heavily dependent on the choice of the particular format used to elicit information about the 
respondent’s preferences. The success CVM has experienced relates directly to the energy, time and 
money spend on the design state of the contingent valuation survey as well as to the question wording, 
the question sequencing and the individual interviewers (Diamond and Hausman 1993). Respondents are 
assumed to be rational and knowledgeable and the best judge of their own interests. Moreover, CVM has 
many acknowledged problems. The hypothetical character induces the occurrences of an impressive list 
of potential biases that result from using CVM. They include strategic bias, embedding bias, part-whole 
bias, starting point bias, and payment vehicle bias (see, for example, OECD 2002; de Blaeij 2003; 
Boardman et al. 2006). 
 
So although CVM has become one of the most widely used non-market valuation technique, debate 
persists over the reliability of CVM. That is, opinion among scientists is divided. Many economists have 
expressed ‘discomfort’ with using the estimates from contingent valuation to measure consumers’ WTP 
for changes in non-market goods, such as regulating and cultural services (e.g. landscape scenery) and 
supporting services. Almost twenty years ago, Diamond and Hausman offered the most dogmatic 
rejection of the method. They (1994, p. 62) tell us that when using a CVM “… one does not estimate 
what its proponents claim to be estimating.”  and  “people simply do not have preferences over non-use 
values” (see also Vatn 2004). Also other scholars, such as Kahneman et al. (1990) and Sagoff (2000) 
express their doubts with respect to the suitability of CVM for various reasons. Nonetheless, the opinions 
of these (resolute) detractors have not slowed research in this area – on the contrary. 
 
Although proponents of CVM acknowledge that CV studies range from very good to very bad and that the 
technique suffers from various design problems that require effort and skill to resolve (Smith 1992; 
Hanemann 1994; Carson 2000), they believe that extensive methodological research and quality 
improvements have already increased the reliability and feasibility of the contingent valuation approach. 
An important stimulus to the use of CVM was the recommendations of the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration’s, or NOAA, panel on contingent valuation (see NOAA 1993). This panel of 
social scientists, co-chaired by two Nobel Prize-winning economists, Kenneth Arrow and Robert Solow, 
specified an extensive set of guidelines for CVM survey development, administration, and analysis. It 
found that CVM, if appropriately conducted, could convey useful information. The NOAA panel’s 
recommendations are now being considered as possible standards for employing CVM. As a result, the 
CV technique is continuing to play a role in monetary valuation, including non-use values, of ecosystem 
services. 
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Choice modeling 
 
Choice modelling (CM) is, like CVM, a stated preference method that is capable of measuring the total 
economic value of a good, and not just the ‘use part’ of this value. In the field of monetary valuation, CM 
is being increasingly applied as an alternative to CVM (Adamowicz et al. 1994;, 1998). Hanley et al. 
(2001, p. 436) define CM as “… a family of survey-based methodologies for modelling preferences for 
goods, where goods are described in terms of their attributes and of the levels that these take.” As such, 
the term choice modelling is somewhat broader in coverage than the method of choice experiments; or, 
to put it more precisely, choice experiments are a derivative of CM.12 
 
CM is capable of measuring consumer acceptance of multi-attribute commodities. Unlike CVM, which 
tends to provide a single value for an expected (spatial or environmental) quality change, a CM enables 
estimation of the value of the change as a whole as well as the implicit values of its (spatial) attributes. 
Generally, in a CM, respondents are confronted with a number of commodity descriptions, or situations, 
that differ according to the attributes described. Respondents are then asked to rank or rate the bundles 
of attributes, or select the most-preferred one from the set. The basic premise underlying this method is 
that commodities, such as wetlands, have a value because of their attributes. In order to decide which 
commodity they want, people make trade-offs between the attributes (de Blaeij 2003).  
 
The theory underlying the method of CM is Lancaster’s model of consumer choice, which hypothesizes 
that consumers derive satisfaction not from goods themselves, but from the attributes they provide 
(Lancaster 1966). In addition, CM are consistent with random utility theory which “… is based on 
probabilistic choice, where individuals are assumed to choose a single alternative which maximizes their 
utility (welfare) from a set of available alternatives.” (Horne et al. 2005, p. 191). A third key element in 
the method of CM – besides Lancaster’s theory of consumer choice and random utility theory – is the 
experimental design; i.e. the construct used to develop and implement an empirical data framework 
within which choices can be studied and contextualized (see Garrod and Willis 1999; for thorough and 
critical descriptions of CM, see Roe et al. 1996; Farber and Griner 2000; Louviere et al. 2000).  
 
CM is designed to determine the structure of preferences that underlie the judgement of multi-attribute 
commodities and to that end, it measures the rates at which people are willing to make such trade-offs 
(Shechter 2000). The inclusion of at least one monetary attribute, such as the cost of provision or the 
WTP for conserving an area, allows for the derivation of implicit prices for each of the other attributes. Of 
course, it is possible to conduct a CM without the inclusion of a monetary attribute. However, if we want 
to calculate the welfare measures of a change in ecosystem services, it is necessary to include a 
monetary attribute such as price or a cost. Speaking broadly and generally, if one of the attributes is 
measured in monetary terms, CM can be used to estimate the welfare implications of a specific spatial 
policy. By deriving empirical values of the willingness to pay (for some benefit) or the willingness to 
accept (compensation for some harm or damage), changes in consumer surplus can be identified as an 
indicator of changes in welfare resulting from a spatial policy action. 
 
Unlike CVM, CM does not directly ask for a ‘willingness-to-pay’, but offers the opportunity to rank all of 
the alternatives from highest (best) to lowest (worst). Defenders of CM therefore argue that the 
technique outperforms CVM on the point of strategic behaviour. The indirect way of questioning in the 
CM allows respondents to explicitly determine trade-offs between different attributes of the ecosystem 
service under valuation. Because CM is designed to rank multi-attribute alternatives, it seems better 
suitable to value ecosystems, which provide a multitude of joint goods and services, than the typical 
one-dimensional CVM (Farber and Griner 2000). It allows obtaining values for specific characteristics of 
scenarios rather than one specific scenario.  
                                                 
12 The term choice modelling is often used interchangeably with the term conjoint analysis (e.g. Hanley et al. 
2001). 
